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OPA OR NOPA? RESTORING COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
IN OIL POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT
ABSTRACT
Catastrophic oil spills are some of the most visible and devastating
contemporary environmental disasters. Unfortunately, a loophole in the Clean
Water Act has significant potential to limit the United States’s ability to
prosecute those who spill oil. Commonly known as the statutory preclusion
provision, the provision prevents the federal government from prosecuting an
action when a state acts first—even if the state has only acted administratively
against a violator. Expansive interpretation of statutory preclusion by federal
courts creates an emerging impediment to effective enforcement against oil
pollution. The highly publicized 2013 decision of United States v. CITGO
Petroleum Corp. was the first oil spill case to address the issue of statutory
preclusion.
This Comment argues that the application of statutory preclusion to Oil
Pollution Act cases is contrary to the original intent of the Congress in
drafting the statutory preclusion provision of the Clean Water Act and
subsequent Oil Pollution Act amendments. Further, applying statutory
preclusion to oil pollution cases undermines effective enforcement. This
Comment proposes that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should
take a leadership role by arguing that its interpretation of the statutory
preclusion provision in its regulations should be entitled to deference under
Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council. Providing Chevron deference
to the EPA’s prosecutorial determinations will resolve a three-way split among
the federal circuits. A uniform rule will also facilitate effective relationships
under cooperative federalism for the benefit of the environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Whether it is 1989 or 2015, images of oil covered birds and tarred beaches
from catastrophic oil spills underscore the need for improved environmental
protection and enforcement.1 Historically, catastrophe was enough to unite the
U.S. Congress to work together on oil pollution reform.2 After the Exxon
Valdez spilled eleven million gallons of crude oil into the Prince William
Sound on March 24, 1989, national outcry erupted over the limited ability of
the federal government to respond to, and clean up, oil spills.3 U.S. citizens
demanded that the federal government have the ability to prosecute and hold
responsible individuals who spilled oil into waters of the United States.4
Congress responded by enacting comprehensive amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act—or the Clean Water Act (CWA).5 These
amendments, known as the Oil Pollution Act amendments of 1990 (OPA
1990), treated oil pollution as an inherently national issue. They provided the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Coast Guard with primary and
comprehensive authority to address oil spills into waters of the United States.6
One of the most important components of this enforcement regime is the
EPA’s ability to levy large criminal and civil penalties against violators.7
Treating oil pollution as a national issue under the CWA creates some
tension with the CWA’s central mandate of cooperative federalism. Under
cooperative federalism, states and the federal government share the
responsibility, with states playing the primary role, to restore the physical,
chemical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.8
1 See, e.g., Sarah Graham, Environmental Effects of Exxon Valdez Spill Still Being Felt, SCI. AM.
(Dec. 19, 2003), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/environmental-effects-of/; Lawrence C. Smith, Jr.,
L. Murphy Smith & Paul A. Ashcroft, Analysis of Environmental and Economic Damages from British
Petroleum Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 74 ALB. L. REV. 563, 576 (2011).
2 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 22288 (1990) (statement of Rep. Silvio Conte) (explaining “it took a disaster
of epic proportions to push us to where we are today” in discussing the passage of OPA 1990).
3 See, e.g., Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Legislation in the
Wake of a Crisis, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Fall 1995, at 35, 35.
4 See id.; 136 CONG. REC. 22288 (1990) (statement of Rep. Silvio Conte) (describing the devastation of
the Exxon Valdez spill).
5 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 22288 (1990) (statement of Rep. Silvio Conte) (explaining the
“comprehensive” approach of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
6 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012).
7 Id. § 1319; see 136 CONG. REC. 21723–24 (1990) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (explaining
the importance of assessing significant civil penalties).
8 See, e.g., Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 5, United States ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Fish
& Game v. HVI Cat Canyon, 76 E.R.C. 1389 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2013) (No. CV 11-05097 DDP), 2013 WL
169877, at *2; see United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013).
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Not surprisingly, state and federal tensions over proper management of oil
pollution remain a pervasive issue in environmental law. In the early years,
states were frustrated with slow federal progress in implementing OPA.9 In the
immediate wake of OPA 1990, many coastal states proposed and adopted
provisions to prosecute oil pollution violators themselves.10 Some states
clashed with federal agencies over the details of enforcement in the immediate
wake of spills.11
Today, the balance between state and federal enforcement of oil pollution is
managed by a single, crudely drafted 1987 Amendment to the CWA that
precipitated the modern OPA provisions. Commonly known as the statutory
preclusion provision,12 the original intent of the provision was to prevent
violators from paying twice for violations due to duplicative enforcement
actions brought by states, citizens, and the federal government.13 The provision
allows an administrative action by the state to preclude pursuit of a federal
civil penalty against a violator, regardless of whether the federal action is
brought by a citizen plaintiff or the EPA. Federal courts inappropriately
applying the statutory preclusion provision when a state prosecutes first now
allows violators to entirely avoid liability .14 For OPA prosecutions, removing
civil penalty liability strikes at the heart of effective federal enforcement.
The increasing size and scale of recent catastrophes by repeat offenders
demand that federal enforcement against OPA violators be more effective, not
less. For example, the EPA collected $25 million—the largest OPA civil
penalty in history up to that point—from BP for the North Slope Alaska Spill
in 2011.15 Just two years later, the 210 million gallon spill and $1 billion civil
penalty collected in the Transocean Settlement—again from BP—dwarfed the
9 See, e.g., Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Joint Hearing Before the H. Subcomms. on Coast Guard & Mar.
Transp. & Water Resources & Env’t of the Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 177 (1999)
[hereinafter Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Joint Hearing] (statement of Sally Ann Lentz) (discussing particular
experience with Washington’s state initiatives passed after the Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
10 See Amy M. Stolls, Oil Spill Legislation in the Coastal United States Since the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 1993 INT’L OIL SPILL CONF. 643, 643–48 (cataloging lead state agencies, oil spill legislation, and oil
spill rules and regulations in twenty-four states).
11 See supra note 9.
12 See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against Successive
Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens, Part Two: Statutory Preclusions on EPA
Enforcement, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 13–19, 22 (2005).
13 Id. at 28.
14 See id. at 29–30.
15 Consent Decree at 8, United States v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., No. 3:09-cv-00064-JWS
(D. Alaska May 3, 2011).
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North Slope spill.16 In 2010, Plains All American Pipeline paid over $3 million
for spills occurring in five states.17 This summer, a spill from a Plains pipeline
spread oil 100 miles down the Santa Barbara coast.18 The bottom line is that
serious spills keep happening, and too often by the same companies.
In the wake of environmental disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon and
other recent spills, scholars have once again called for Congress to pass OPA
reforms.19 However, given the congressional stalemate over most
environmental issues,20 this Comment looks to how OPA litigation might be
used to make national OPA enforcement more effective.
Notably, a litigation approach calls for a marked departure from the typical
mechanics of EPA enforcement. The EPA prefers to settle OPA cases, as
evidenced by the fact that, since 1999, more than ten OPA consent decrees
have been filed21—and only two cases have gone to litigation under OPA
1990.22
But recent case law indicates that the EPA may no longer have the
discretion to continue its preference for settlement if it wishes to effectively
enforce OPA violations. In 2013, defendants first availed themselves of the
statutory preclusion provision during litigation of an oil pollution civil
penalties prosecution in United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.23 In CITGO,
the company’s failure to clean its produced water holding tanks resulted in a
significant accumulation of oil.24 When the tanks overflowed due to a large
storm event, over two million gallons of oil flowed into a nearby river,
16 Partial Consent Decree Between the Plaintiff United States of America and the Defendants Triton
Asset Leasing GmbH, Transocean Holdings LLC, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., and
Transocean Deepwater Inc. at 9, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on
April 20, 2010, 841 F. Supp. 2d 988 (E.D. La. Jan. 3, 2013) (No. 10-4536) [hereinafter Partial Consent
Decree].
17 Consent Decree at 11–12, United States v. Plains All American Pipeline, L.P., No. 4:10-cv-2833 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 10, 2010) (collecting a penalty of $3.25 million).
18 Michael R. Blood, Santa Barbara Spill Might Be Larger than Projected, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5,
2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20150805/santa-barbara-oil-spill-might-be-largerthan-projected.
19 Kenneth A. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act: Current Law and Needed Revisions, 71
LA. L. REV. 917, 938–39 (2011).
20 Hari Osofsky & Jaqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695 (2016).
21 See Civil Cases and Settlements by Statute, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY http://cfpub.epa.gov/
enforcement/cases/index.cfm?templatePage=12&ID=3 (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
22 See, e.g., Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8, at 5; see United States v.
CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013).
23 See 723 F.3d at 551.
24 Id. at 550.
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resulting in a fish kill and covering numerous birds with oil.25 As the first case
to go to trial for civil penalties under OPA26 and raise the statutory preclusion
defense,27 CITGO was closely followed by environmental counsel, states, and
firms around the country. In the popular press, CITGO was discussed as a
model for the Deepwater Horizon prosecution.28 Although the statutory
preclusion defense was unsuccessful in CITGO, the case simultaneously raised
the profile of the statutory preclusion provision. Consequently, statutory
preclusion is an emerging issue in the effectiveness of oil pollution
enforcement.29
In light of the implications of CITGO, this Comment analyzes the impacts
of statutory preclusion on OPA enforcement. This Comment proceeds in three
Parts. Part I explores the relationship between legislative intent, OPA, and
statutory preclusion provisions under the principles of cooperative federalism
in the CWA. Part I includes a novel analysis of to the EPA’s guidance on the
application of statutory preclusion to OPA cases and details the broad
expansion of statutory preclusion by the federal courts in a manner that is
inconsistent with legislative intent. Part II next demonstrates how, contrary to
established legislative intent, the broad application of statutory preclusion to
oil cases directly undermines effective oil pollution enforcement and
cooperative federalism. Finally, Part III explores how the application of
Chevron deference to the EPA’s regulatory interpretation of the statutory
preclusion provision would make judicial interpretation of the provision more
consistent with legislative intent. Further, arguing for Chevron deference
places the agency in a position of leadership in oil pollution prosecution and
promotes cooperative federalism. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the
application of Chevron deference and a uniform national standard for statutory
preclusion will create net benefits for states, citizens, the EPA, industry, and
the environment.

25

See id. at 549.
See, e.g., Craig Isenberg, Andrea Mahady Price & Adam Swensek, Calculating Economic Benefit
Under the Oil Pollution Act Amendments to the Clean Water Act, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Fall 2011, at 36.
27 CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d at 550.
28 Margaret Cronin Fisk & Brian Swint, BP Has Road Map in CITGO Oil-Spill Case for Macondo Fine,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 6, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-06/bp-has-roadmap-in-CITGO-case-to-formula-for-oil-spill-fine.html.
29 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
26
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I. OIL POLLUTION AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE CLEAN WATER
ACT: HOW THE STATUTORY PRECLUSION PROVISION EXPANDED BEYOND ITS
INTENDED SCOPE
Even though Congress intended the statutory preclusion provision to
support cooperative federalism, nearly thirty years of confused application of
the provision by federal courts has resulted in the provision actually
undermining the shared responsibility of the federal government and states to
manage water pollution.30 In this Part, section A first explains the basic
principles of cooperative federalism in the CWA and the Act’s statutory
preclusion provision. Section B turns to the discussion of the modest roots of
the statutory preclusion provision in cooperative federalism through a
discussion of legislative history. Section B then traces the parallel development
of EPA enforcement of the water and oil provisions of the statute to show how
they have diverged over time since the passage of the statutory preclusion
provision. This demonstrates the current and substantial potential for statutory
preclusion to undermine oil pollution prosecutions. Next, section C discusses
EPA guidance documents on the application of the statutory preclusion
provision to explain the EPA’s early attempts to advocate for judicial
interpretation of the provision consistent with legislative intent. Finally, section
D traces the development of statutory preclusion litigation by citizens and the
EPA to show how courts expanded the provision from its modest roots in the
citizen suit context to broadly bar effective enforcement by the federal
government.
A. Cooperative Federalism, Enforcement, and Statutory Preclusion
The CWA is founded upon cooperative federalism—the notion that the
responsibility for the enforcement and maintenance of environmental laws
should be shared between the states and federal government.31 The EPA
administers the CWA,32 but the Act’s preamble gives states the primary
responsibility “to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”33 Accordingly,
states have the opportunity to develop and submit for approval National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) programs, which issue
30

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2012).
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (explaining that the CWA is a statute
that exemplifies “cooperative federalism”); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (the CWA
“anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective”).
32 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
33 Id. § 1251(b).
31
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permits to track and limit discharges into the waters of the United States.34
Although states must obtain the EPA’s approval for the administration of such
NPDES permitting programs, states maintain the freedom to develop their own
statutory schemes to control water pollution.35
Responsibility for enforcement of water pollution laws was also intended to
be shared amongst states, citizens, and the federal government.36 Congress
enacted the CWA in 1972, at a time when the public and scholars were
concerned about agencies being captured by regulated industry.37 Because of
this concern, the CWA facilitated citizen enforcement through the creation of a
private right of action for citizens to sue under federal law.38 The EPA, states,
and citizens all enforce permit compliance.39 The EPA may seek injunctive
relief, criminal penalties, civil penalties, and administrative penalties under the
water enforcement provisions.40 Citizens claiming under the citizen suit
provision may also seek injunctive relief and civil penalties under the water
enforcement provisions.41 However, the EPA—and only the EPA42—may
prosecute a violator under the OPA provisions for criminal penalties and civil
penalties.43
In view of these multiple enforcement authorities, it is critical to understand
that, apart from the citizen suit context, CWA enforcement actions are seldom
litigated. This has important implications for an analysis of how to improve
enforcement.
States
typically
prosecute
environmental
violators

34

See id. § 1342(b).
See id. § 1342(b)(7).
36 See id. § 1365; ENVTL. POLICY DIV. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG., 93D
CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 215–17
(1973) (statement of Sen. Evan Bayh).
37 Joel A. Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver Bernstein’s Captive Agency
Theory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
38 These are commonly known as citizen suits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(2).
39 See id. § 1342(b)(7).
40 See id. § 1319(c), (d), (g).
41 See id. § 1365 (citizens enforce civil penalties under § 1319(d)).
42 This may involve cost recovery for the Coast Guard, but EPA brings the enforcement action. See, e.g.,
Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8 (exemplifying enforcement action).
43 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (making no reference to state enforcement of OPA); Apalachicola
Riverkeeper v. Taylor Energy Co., 954 F. Supp. 2d 448, 454–55 (E.D. La. 2013) (explaining that citizens must
prosecute oil pollution under a citizen suit brought under § 1365 to enforce against oil as a pollutant
discharged without a permit under § 1342, not § 1321); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Severstal Sparrows Point,
LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d. 602, 618–19 (D. Md. 2011) (“[I]f Congress intended to allow citizen suits for the
enforcement of § 1321, Congress would have included § 1321 in the citizen suit provision.”).
35
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administratively.44 The EPA has the option of pursuing administrative or
judicial enforcement.45 But even in the case of federal judicial enforcement,
generally the end goal for the EPA and the violator is to put a consent decree
into place. Such consent decrees are the launch point for a relationship between
the agency and the violator. They typically contain detailed prescriptions for
injunctive relief and a schedule of activities to be performed by the violator to
bring the company into compliance.46 In the event of a further violation or
recurring harm, the EPA can return to court for an order to enforce a specific
provision of the decree. The EPA publishes consent decrees on its website and
allows a period for public comment before entering the decree. But the mere
publication of a consent decree on the EPA’s website provides very little
insight into the negotiation process—or what problems might exist within it.
When Congress added the administrative penalties provision in 1987, it
recognized that there might be some potential for overlapping enforcement by
citizens, and state and federal authorities. Thus, Congress added the statutory
preclusion provision to attempt to manage this potential overlap. The statutory
preclusion provision dictates that an action by the Administrator will be
precluded when a state “has commenced” and is “diligently prosecuting an
action under a State law comparable to this subsection.”47 Federal or citizen
prosecution is also barred when a “State has issued a final order not subject to
further judicial review and the violator has paid a penalty assessed under this
subsection, or such comparable State law.”48 This bar protects violators from a
duplicative action brought by the EPA or a citizen under the judicial civil
penalties provision of the CWA.49 Most curiously, the provision also protects
environmental violators from federal judicial civil penalties brought under
§ 311, the provision that became the central focus of OPA 1990.50
Remarkably, the protection afforded to environmental violators by the
statutory preclusion from additional claims is much broader than that available
44 For example, the controlling statutory preclusion precedent in the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
each resulted from citizen challenges commenced after a state administrative prosecution. See, e.g., McAbee v.
Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003); see Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., 83 F.3d 1111, 1115–17 (9th Cir. 1996); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d
552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991).
45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e), (g).
46 See, e.g., Consent Decree, supra note 17, at 13–19 (containing detailed measures for upgrading and
maintaining oil pipeline to bring the company into compliance).
47 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii).
48 See id.
49 Id. § 1319(d).
50 Id. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(iii).
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under the common law doctrines of claim and issue preclusion, which bar the
ability of an issue or claim to be re-litigated in court.51 This is because a citizen
or federal action may be precluded when the state has commenced and is
diligently prosecuting (or has diligently prosecuted) an administrative penalty
action.52 The fact that Congress has never shared the EPA’s oil enforcement
authority with states or citizens makes it even more surprising that Congress
would extend this broad protection.53 In an attempt to shed light on the
intended purpose of the provision, section B examines the legislative history
behind the statutory preclusion provision.
B. The Statutory Preclusion Provision’s Modest Roots
Congress intended the statutory preclusion provision to have a modest
impact upon enforcement of the CWA. Reviewing the Committee Reports and
floor remarks of Senator Lincoln Chafee, the bill sponsor and member of the
Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, reveals four key
observations: (1) the provision was intended to encourage vigilant state
enforcement of environmental laws, (2) the provision was only to apply when
states had adopted a particular, narrow statutory framework, (3) the provision
was not intended to disrupt judicial enforcement, and (4) the provision barred
largely interchangeable courses of action under the oil and water provisions
where concern for duplication was reasonable.
First, Senator Chafee expressly stated that under the provision “redundant
enforcement activity” was “to be avoided and State action to remedy a
violation of Federal law . . . to be encouraged.”54 As such, an interpretation of
the provision that would encourage states to pass lax environmental laws,
shield violators from prosecution, or deter states from moving quickly to
remedy violations of federal law would contravene legislative intent.
Second, Senator Chafee’s floor remarks set out narrow parameters for
when state action would be sufficient to preclude a federal prosecution.
51 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR JOINT
STATE/FEDERAL CIVIL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION 17–18 (2003) (discussing particular
application of claim and issue preclusion in environmental enforcement cases).
52 See Miller, supra note 12, at 20, 37. However, some courts have expanded the interpretation so that a
penalty order is not necessary. See, e.g., N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552,
557 (1st Cir. 1991).
53 See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d. 602, 618–
19 (D. Md. 2011); see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (making no reference to state enforcement of OPA).
54 See 133 CONG. REC. 1264 (1987) (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee).
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Significantly, Senator Chafee limited the set of states that could bring an
action, noting “only if a State has received authorization under section 402 [the
NPDES permitting program]55 to implement a particular permitting program
can it prosecute a violation of Federal law.”56 Further, Senator Chaffee
explained his perspective regarding the terminology of “proceeding under a
State law comparable to [the administrative penalties provision].”57 In Senator
Chafee’s view, “a State law must provide for a right to a hearing and for public
notice and participation procedures . . . it must include analogous penalty
assessment factors and judicial review standards; and it must include
provisions that are analogous to the other elements of [the administrative
penalties provision].”58 Senator Chafee also indicated that a “Federal judicial
civil penalty action or a citizen suit is not to be commenced if an
administrative penalty proceeding is already underway.”59 In effect, this
statement limited the state or federal action to a penalty proceeding, as opposed
to a proceeding for solely injunctive relief.
Third, Senator Chaffee’s remarks and the Senate Committee Report
expressed that the preclusion provision was not intended to undermine judicial
enforcement. Senator Chaffee explained that the provision was not “intended
to lead to the disruption of any federal judicial penalty action then
underway.”60 The statement suggests that the intent of the provision—at least
in part—was to ensure that more serious violations should be handled
judicially instead of administratively.61 The Senate Committee Report echoed
these sentiments. Specifically, the Senate Committee Report expressed that the
administrative penalties provision should “not . . . replace a vigorous judicial
enforcement program.”62 The Senate Committee further recognized that
“[c]ivil judicial enforcement is a keystone of successful enforcement of the Act
and necessary for . . . serious violations of the Act, or large penalty actions.”63
Fourth, the legislative history is significant in that it fails to distinguish
between enforcement actions brought under the administrative penalties
provision for water, civil penalties provision for water, and civil penalties
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
133 CONG. REC. 1264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 26 (1985).
Id.
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provision for oil. Regarding applicability to OPA, the interchangeable use of
the various penalty provisions in the legislative history reflects that at the time
of the statutory preclusion provision’s enactment, the new administrative
penalties,64 water,65 and oil66 enforcement provisions were similar courses of
action for the federal government to pursue.67
By all accounts, the legislative history suggests that the statutory preclusion
provision was intended to create incentives for effective state enforcement
without disrupting the EPA judicial enforcement scheme. Yet, as this
Comment will demonstrate in section E of this Part, interpretation of the
statutory preclusion provision by federal courts takes the provision far from
these modest roots. Such divergence is also significant because Congress and
the EPA expanded oil enforcement authority after 1987. Section C explores
how the statutory language and federal application of the water and oil
enforcement provisions have been adapted so that the enforcement
consequences between these provisions are no longer similar.
C. Congressional and Administrative Expansion of Oil Prosecution Since
Enactment of the Statutory Preclusion Provision
Three years after the adoption of the statutory preclusion provision, the
OPA 1990 amendments resulted in profound changes in oil spill prosecutions
in the United States.68 Subsection 1 reviews amendments to the definition for
what constitutes a violation, potential liability exposure for violators, and
criteria considered in penalty assessments, showing how the oil pollution
provisions are no longer interchangeable with the administrative penalties
provision. Subsection 2 explores how the EPA now applies OPA to prosecute
different types of violators and violations under the water and oil enforcement
provisions.
1. The OPA Amendments of 1990 Expand Liability
OPA 1990 dramatically changed the scope and liability potential for
spilling oil into United States waters. While the CWA administrative penalties
scheme and OPA enforcement were roughly comparable in 1987, OPA 1990
64

33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. § 1321(e) (prohibiting enforcement for the same violations under § 1319(d) and § 1321(b));
133 CONG. REC. 1264 (1987) (statement of Sen. Lincoln Chafee).
68 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 5494 (1999) (statement of Sen. Theodore Stevens).
65
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increased potential liability and amended factors used to calculate a civil
penalty. As such, the statutory preclusion provision functions as a much
broader bar to oil spill enforcement today than it was enacted.
When the statutory preclusion provision was added to the CWA in 1987,
Congress had already declared a national policy that there should be “no
discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the navigable waters of
the United States.”69 A violation occurs if there is a discharge in “quantities
which may be harmful.”70 Harmful is defined as when the discharge
“[c]ause[s] a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of the water or
adjoining shorelines or cause[s] a sludge or emulsion to be deposited beneath
the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines.”71 In the event of such a
violation, the 1987 oil pollution provision created a maximum civil penalty of
$50,000 per violation, except in the case of “willful negligence or willful
misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner.”72 In such cases,
the oil pollution provision instituted a maximum penalty of $250,000.73
Especially in the absence of willful negligence, this penalty structure was
somewhat similar to what was available in the administrative penalties
provision.74 Under the administrative penalties provision, a penalty of up to
$10,000 per violation but not to exceed $25,000 was made available to
prosecute a violator under the Act.75 Thus, just after the passage of the 1987
amendment the federal government could proceed with a similar penalty action
through prosecution under the judicial enforcement provisions for oil76 or the
administrative penalties provision. As such, the statutory preclusion bar on oil
prosecution appeared more reasonable.77
OPA 1990 created much greater liability potential for violators than
available under the administrative penalties provision.78 Today, the
administrative penalty provision creates liability of up to $16,000 per day or

69 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (1982). “Navigable waters” is defined as “waters of the United States.” See id.
§ 1362(7).
70 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
71 40 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2014).
72 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f).
73 Id.
74 Compare id. § 1321(b), with 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2) (2012).
75 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2) (2012).
76 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1982).
77 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (1988).
78 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7) (2012), with 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (1988).
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per violation with a total cap of $37,500.79 In contrast, the oil enforcement
provision creates liability of up to a $37,500 per day or $2,100 per barrel80 for
spills not occasioned by gross negligence.81 For spills occasioned by gross
negligence, the EPA may seek a civil penalty of up to $5,300 per barrel and
will levy a minimum of $150,000 in civil penalties.82 This dramatic increase in
civil penalties was a part of OPA’s comprehensive scheme to deter significant
environmental damage.83 Consequently, civil penalty liability in OPA cases
can easily reach into the millions of dollars,84 especially for large spill events
or in cases where there have been a series of smaller spills over time.85
The significant increase in liability potential under OPA shows how the
statutory preclusion provision’s capacity to undermine judicial enforcement is
much greater now than when it was enacted in 1987. Specifically, state
prosecution under a statute with liability limits comparable to the
administrative penalties provision, which caps liability at $37,500 can
potentially bar a multi-million dollar OPA civil penalty in a judicial action.
OPA 1990 also amended the factors considered in civil penalty
assessments.86 While five of these factors are analogous to those set out in the
administrative penalties provision, the OPA provision does not account for the
violator’s ability to pay and presents two additional factors for analysis:

79 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (2012), as modified by Adjustment of Civil Monetary Penalties for
Inflation, 40 C.F.R. 19.4 (2014) (applying the most recent figures adjusted for inflation).
80 One barrel of oil equals forty-two gallons. See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CIVIL
PENALTY POLICY FOR SECTION 311(b)(3) AND SECTION 311(j) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 2, 12 (1998).
81 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7), as superseded by 40 C.F.R. 19.4 (applying the most recent figures adjusted for
inflation).
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 22288 (1990) (statement of Rep. Silvio Conte).
84 For an extreme example, see Smith et al., supra note 1, at 585 (estimating potential CWA damages at
$4.7 billion). Of course, the actual CWA civil penalty collected was $1 billion. Partial Consent Decree, supra
note 16, at 9.
85 See, e.g., United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing an
appeal in which the United States argued the $6 million penalty awarded by the lower court was inadequate for
a single large spill event); Consent Decree, supra note 17, at 1, 11–12 (collecting a penalty of $3.25 million for
ten spills over a span of several years).
86 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(8) (tasking the Administrator or court to consider the following factors to assess a
civil penalty: “the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit to the violator, if any,
resulting from the violation, the degree of culpability involved, any other penalty for the same incident, any
history of prior violations, the nature, extent, and degree of success of any efforts of the violator to minimize
or mitigate the effects of the discharge, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and any other
matters as justice may require”).
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(1) additional penalties paid in association with the activities, and (2) the
economic impact upon the violator.87
The changes in OPA civil penalty assessment factors show that the OPA
provisions are now intended to prosecute more serious violations than those
prosecuted under the administrative penalties provisions. Under the
administrative penalties provision, the government may reduce a penalty in
light of ability to pay.88 However, the oil enforcement provisions contemplate a
civil penalty may still be assessed even when it duplicates a criminal penalty,
and has the potential to affect whether an operator may remain in business.89
This makes OPA penalties far more punitive in nature. Consequently, the
expansion of the oil provisions in OPA 1990 means that the statutory
preclusion provision has significantly greater potential to disrupt federal
enforcement efforts than when it was enacted.
2. The EPA’s Expanded Application of Oil Pollution Act Civil Penalties
Provisions
After OPA 1990, the EPA has aggressively expanded prosecution under the
oil provisions so that the water and oil provisions target dramatically different
kinds of violators.90 Expanded prosecution means that the statutory preclusion
provision can bar prosecutions against classes of polluters and environmental
harms unforeseen by the 1987 Congress that passed the statutory preclusion
provision.
The types of violators and violations prosecuted under OPA have expanded
substantially since 1990. This, in part, is because the oil enforcement provision
is used to prosecute individuals who discharge oil and those violators
discharging other hazardous materials that create a “sheen.”91 For example, the
federal government recently used OPA to prosecute a Tyson Farms rendering
facility for the discharge of animal byproducts into a North Carolina

87

Compare id. § 1319(g)(3), with id. § 1321(b)(8).
Id. § 1319(g)(3).
89 See id. § 1321(b)(8).
90 See generally Civil Cases and Settlements by Statute, supra note 21 (noting various enforcement
actions).
91 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (2014) (defining harmful quality as a discharge that “[c]ause[s] a film or sheen upon
or discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining shorelines or cause[s] a sludge or emulsion to be
deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines”).
88
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waterway.92 Other violators include railway operators and regional and
nationally operating oil companies.93 In a 2010 case brought by the United
States against onshore operator Plains All American, the EPA collected civil
penalties of $3.25 million and instituted injunctive relief measures after ten
spills occurred in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Kansas over a three-year
period.94 The broad variety of violators prosecuted under OPA share the
common distinction of being large companies with a regional, and often
national, presence.
In contrast, EPA prosecutes violators under the civil or administrative
penalties provisions for violations of NPDES permits95—or for failing to
obtain a permit—rather than under the outright prohibition created by OPA.96
Such violators are usually locally operating facilities or municipality-owned
facilities.97 Many of the violators under the general water enforcement
provisions are municipalities that slip into a pattern of violation through a lack
of resources to maintain facilities to prevent discharges.98 Typically, to proceed
judicially, the EPA requires a pervasive pattern of environmental harm due to
lack of maintenance, resource constraints, or institutional constraints.99 For
example, in a recent consent decree, the EPA obtained a settlement with Fort
Smith, Arkansas, which had more than 2,000 discharges of untreated sewage

92

See, e.g., Complaint at 7, United States v. Tyson Farms, Inc., No. 5:14cv82 (W.D.N.C. May 28, 2014);
see also Complaint at 5, United States v. Union Pac. R.R., No. CV10-0076 (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2010) (spilling
diesel into a waterway due to a train derailment).
93 See, e.g., United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2013); Complaint at 4,
Union Pac. R.R., No. CV10-0076.
94 See Consent Decree, supra note 17, at 1, 11–12 (collecting a penalty of $3.25 million for ten spills
over a span of several years).
95 See, e.g., Consent Agreement and Final Order at 3, ABC Coke Division, Drummond Co., 2014 WL
5137782 (No. CWA-04-2014-4507(b)) (Envtl. Prot. Agency Sept. 30, 2014).
96 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2012) (explaining that there shall be no spills into or upon the navigable
waters).
97 See, e.g., Consent Agreement and Final Order, supra note 95, at 4 (requiring payment of $20,550 to
settle an unpermitted discharge violation from a biological treatment facility under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2));
Fort Smith, Arkansas Agrees to Upgrade Sewer System to Reduce Discharges of Raw Sewage into Local
Waterways/City will also Develop a Program to Help Low Income Communities Improve Sewer
Infrastructure, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter EPA Press Release], http://yosemite.
epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/20A98EB2CEA636A285257DC400657AC5.
98 EPA Press Release, supra note 97.
99 See id. (reporting a case in which the EPA found a pervasive pattern of environmental harm due to
lack of maintenance). For an example of an institutional barrier addressed in the statute itself, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(e), which requires that states be joined to any federal action against a municipality to discourage states
from passing laws that prevent municipalities from raising funds to comply with a federal judgment.
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into local waterways due to its failure to maintain its municipal system since
2004.100
As demonstrated, OPA and its application by the EPA in federal
enforcement actions has evolved substantially since the passage of the
statutory preclusion provision.101 OPA prosecutions now serve as a major
check on water pollution committed by national companies. Because the
diversity of targets and scale of OPA actions have increased, the applicability
of the statutory preclusion provision to OPA can shield those who commit
significant environmental harm from liability.102
D. The EPA Guidance on Statutory Preclusion: Early Efforts to Advocate for
a Position Consistent with Legislative Intent
Because the EPA generally operates with a distinct preference for
settlement in OPA cases, the EPA’s ability to explain and address these
changes in light of the statutory preclusion provision has been limited. The
EPA continues to rely on agency guidance documents—the most recent of
which is more than twenty years old—to assess the application of the statutory
preclusion to OPA cases. Reviewing this guidance is critical for two reasons.
First, the EPA currently applies these guidance documents when it confronts a
potential statutory preclusion problem in an OPA prosecution. Second, and to
be explored later in this Comment, it provides a critical record for
substantiating the agency’s expertise and judgment in securing a more
appropriate application of the statutory preclusion provision to OPA cases.
Since the enactment of the statutory preclusion provision, the EPA has
advocated that the provision should be interpreted consistently with its
legislative history by issuing guidance documents in 1987103 and 1993.104 Both
documents provide minimal treatment regarding applicability to OPA.105 The
limited references to OPA in both guidance documents indicated that a state

100

EPA Press Release, supra note 97.
Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1982), with 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B) (2012).
102 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2012).
103 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON STATE ACTION PREEMPTING CIVIL PENALTY ACTIONS
UNDER THE FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT 2 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 GUIDANCE].
104 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE ON SECTION 309(g)(6)(A) OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT (1993) [hereinafter 1993 GUIDANCE].
105 See generally 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 1 (providing minimal guidance regarding
applicability to OPA); 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 2 (providing minimal guidance regarding
applicability to OPA).
101
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action would not bar a federal OPA claim unless it was brought under a state
statute comparable to the administrative penalties provision.106
The 1987 Guidance, which relies heavily on the aforementioned floor
statements of Senator Chaffee, set out three general requirements for a
statutory preclusion claim. These are (1) the state has delegated authority for
enforcement; (2) the state action must be concluded, or commenced and
diligently prosecuted; and (3) the state statutory provision must be comparable
to the administrative penalties provision.107 The guidance documents also
address a fourth important point: that the EPA is also affected by federal court
interpretation of the statutory preclusion provision, even when this
interpretation occurs in citizen suit litigation. The following analysis explores
each of these issues in turn.
1. The State Has Delegated Authority for Enforcement
Under the first guidance requirement, the EPA approval of the state
NPDES program is critical to whether the EPA has delegated some of its
enforcement authority under federal law to the state.108 Without this delegation
of authority, the EPA administers the NPDES permitting program under
federal law, giving the EPA the proper authority for enforcement of permit
violations.109 However, the Congress has never created a mechanism for the
EPA to delegate its authority to the states to enforce oil pollution laws.110
Nevertheless, under the guidance documents, potential for statutory preclusion
would only arise under OPA when a state deputized to enforce the CWA
prosecutes an oil spill violation.111
2. The Diligent Prosecution Requirements
Regarding the second requirement, the guidance documents create a high
bar for the diligence of the state prosecution. In the case of a past action, the
state must actually recover, at a minimum, the economic benefit to the
violator.112 The state prosecution should be sufficient to gain “compliance

106
107
108
109
110
111
112

See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 1; 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 2.
See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 3–4.
Id. at 3.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2012).
See id. § 1321(b) (containing no discussion of delegated authority for OPA enforcement).
See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 3; 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 1.
1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 3 n.4.
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without undue delay.”113 Consistent with the guidance interpretation, CWA
enforcement regulations have preserved the ability of the EPA to bring an
additional action when the state recovers a “substantially inadequate”
penalty.114
State OPA prosecutions are unlikely to meet the guidance standards for
diligent prosecution where an OPA violator commits a series of violations or
even in the event of a large spill occasioned by lack of proper maintenance.
Specifically, state penalties for water pollution control laws often track those
available under the administrative and civil penalties of the CWA.115 For large
oil companies, paying an administrative or civil penalty under state law is
likely to cost less than instituting adequate measures to prevent spills. In such
cases, the state would not recover the economic benefit to the violator even if it
recovered the statutory maximum penalty.116 In applying the guidance
documents, the EPA would find that its civil penalty prosecution would not be
barred because the state would not have met the minimum requirement of
collecting economic benefit. Similarly, if a company continued to have spills
after the entry of a consent order with a state, it would likely not meet the
guidance requirement that the state prosecution must be sufficient to gain
“compliance without undue delay.”117
However, the guidance documents appear to support statutory preclusion in
the instance that a state moves first to prosecute a large spill violation. As
noted by environmental counsel in CITGO, in a number of large oil spill cases
there may be little or no economic benefit to the violator from a large spill.118
This is because the loss of oil represents the loss of a valuable resource, and
the company was already adopting what it believed to be sufficient measures to
guard against such a loss.119 Although the circuit judge was not persuaded by
this argument under the facts of CITGO,120 such reasoning may hold up in
other circumstances. However, federal regulators applying the 1993 guidance
analysis requiring “compliance without undue delay” may be unsuccessful if

113

Id. at 3.
See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note (2014).
115 Which, even when identical to the administrative penalties provision, would limit liability to $10,000
per violation with a cap of $25,000. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(2)(A) (2012).
116 See Miller, supra note 12, at 25–26.
117 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 3.
118 Isenberg et al., supra note 26, at 39.
119 Id. at 40.
120 United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 552 (5th Cir. 2013).
114

LAMB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

2/25/2016 10:07 AM

OPA OR NOPA?

859

the violator has already cleaned up the spill and corrected the problem.121
Consequently, in the case of a large spill violation, a state administrative
penalty may bar a federal prosecution—and likely fall short of the
congressional demand for deterrence and punishment of OPA violators.122
3. Requirements for Statutory Comparability
In their most simple terms, EPA guidance documents require that the state
law must be comparable to the CWA administrative penalties provision to bar
a judicial action by the EPA. Applying this analysis to the civil liability and
penalty assessment factors under OPA is problematic. As described in the
previous section, the administrative penalties provision and OPA impose
dramatically different liability on the violator123 and set out different factors to
be considered in the calculation of a civil penalty.124 However, the guidance
position is that the state law must contain equivalent civil penalty liability
limits125 and analogous factors for penalty assessment to the administrative
penalties provision.126
The plain reading of the guidance and statute is that the action must be
brought under a statute comparable to the administrative penalties provision to
bar the OPA action.127 However, this reading creates the potential for a legally
absurd result.128 To illustrate, a state could preclude federal enforcement when
a state prosecutes an oil spill under its administrative penalties provision, but
not if it prosecutes a violator under an oil specific provision. In fact, a number
of states adopted oil-specific pollution provisions after OPA 1990.129 Applying
the figures from section C, a state issuing the maximum penalty could order a
state to pay $37,500 to bar a potential multi-million dollar penalty under

121

1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 3.
See 136 CONG. REC. 21,723–24 (1990) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (explaining the
importance of assessing significant civil penalties).
123 See supra text accompanying notes 79–82.
124 See supra text accompanying note 78.
125 See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 4.
126 See id.
127 See 33 U.S.C. §1319(g)(6) (2012) (requiring “[s]tate law comparable to this subsection”); see also
Miller, supra note 18, at 48–49 (making a convincing argument as to why this was the legislature’s intended
reading). However, Professor Miller does not address the absurdity of the provision with applicability to OPA.
128 See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454–55 (1989) (setting a high standard, but
nevertheless acknowledging that there are appropriate circumstances for the application of the absurdity
doctrine in statutory interpretation).
129 See Stolls, supra note 10, at 645–46.
122
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OPA.130 As a result, such an interpretation creates the potential for state
regulators to shield violators from federal prosecution, directly contrary to the
intent of the statutory preclusion provision.131
4. Statutory Preclusion Litigation Applies to Citizens and the Agency
Finally, the 1993 guidance document also illustrates the unique nature of
the statutory preclusion provision in that it applies equally to citizens and the
EPA.132 Consequently, litigation under citizen suits likewise affects the
Agency.133 However, the EPA issued both guidance documents prior to any of
its actions where the state initially prosecuted a violator and the federal
government chose to pursue a subsequent penalty.134 The following section
explores how federal courts have analyzed statutory preclusion up to this point,
and begins a preliminary analysis of how judicial interpretations may impact
regulated industry.
E. Misapplication of Statutory Preclusion by the Federal Courts
As highlighted by the 1993 guidance document, judicial interpretation of
the statutory preclusion provision in citizen suits has direct implications for
EPA enforcement. This has become increasingly problematic for federal
enforcement because the vast majority of litigation under the statutory
preclusion provision has been through citizen suits. As previously explained,
the EPA prefers to settle its enforcement actions through consent decrees.
Because the same law applies to the EPA as applies to citizens, the EPA, in
negotiating consent decrees, must take into account interpretations of the
statutory preclusion provision in citizen suits—and broad views of statutory
preclusion can (and will) be leveraged against the EPA in settlement
negotiations. Nevertheless, the EPA has brought an additional enforcement
action after a state, commonly referred to as “overfiling,” on two occasions.135
This section examines litigation by citizens and the EPA under the statutory

130

See supra text accompanying notes 79, 84.
See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 4; Miller, supra note 12, at 29.
132 See Miller, supra note 12, at 29.
133 Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3–4,
Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-15139), 1995 WL
17069780, at *3–4.
134 See United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 550–51 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 1999).
135 CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d at 550–51; Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d at 526.
131
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preclusion provision, and demonstrates how interpretations by federal courts
fail to align with the statutory preclusion provision’s intended purpose.
1. Judicial Creation of a Broad Bar Through Citizen Suit Litigation
Judicial interpretation of the statutory preclusion provision has been
chaotic. While courts have used a three-step framework to apply the statutory
preclusion analysis to state prosecutions, courts split on the application of each
prong of the analysis.136 First, courts determine whether an action has been
commenced by a state actor.137 Second, courts determine whether a state actor
is diligently prosecuting the action or has diligently prosecuted the action.138
Third, courts analyze whether the state law at issue is sufficiently comparable
to the administrative penalties provision of the CWA.139
Under the first prong, a court determines whether the action has been
commenced for an ongoing prosecution, or if a prosecution has been
commenced and concluded in the case of a past state prosecution. Courts have
split over when an action is actually commenced by the state. While the
majority of courts have found an action is commenced upon the receipt of an
administrative compliance order, some courts restrict commencement to filing
in a court of law.140
Turning to the second prong, courts have also split over the requirements
for a diligent prosecution. While courts will generally presume the state’s
prosecution was in fact diligent, courts have differed sharply on the evidentiary

136 See, e.g., McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases for
judicial approach to 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) preclusion claims). Some courts perform similar steps in different
order. See, e.g., Lockett v. EPA, 176 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (E.D. La. 2001).
137 The state actor could be either the state Attorney General or the state environmental agency
responsible for enforcing the law. Different states adopt different approaches to prosecuting environmental
violations. See also McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1251. Compare McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1252 (prosecution would be
barred by an administrative penalty issued by the state environmental department), with N.Y. Coastal
Fishermen’s Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (providing an
example of a state statutory scheme involving state attorney general consultation).
138 See, e.g., McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1251; Lockett, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
139 See, e.g., McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1251.
140 See generally Pape v. Menominee Paper Co., 911 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (following the
majority approach of allowing administrative activity to preclude a federal action). But see Jones v. City of
Lakeland, 224 F.3d 518, 522 (6th Cir. 2000) (restricting the diligent prosecution bar to actions pursued in a
court of law).

LAMB GALLEYSPROOFS2

862

2/25/2016 10:07 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:841

showing necessary to overcome this presumption.141 For example, the Middle
District of Alabama has created a multi-factor analysis, which assesses whether
the actions target the violations duplicitously under the same standard, the
likelihood of continuing violations despite settlement, and any evidence of
insufficient recovery of economic benefit to a violator.142 Applied in an OPA
prosecution, this standard would likely prevent a statutory preclusion bar in an
OPA action because a state administrative action would not likely proceed
under a standard prohibiting spills, as required under OPA. While the Middle
District of Alabama’s definition roughly tracks the EPA’s definition of diligent
prosecution, other district courts have held that the presumption may not be
overcome “absent persuasive evidence that the state has engaged in a pattern of
conduct in its prosecution of the defendant that could be considered dilatory,
collusive or otherwise in bad faith.”143 This standard of bad faith almost creates
a conclusive presumption to give broader preclusive effect to state
enforcement.
Third, once a court determines that the action was both commenced and
diligently prosecuted, the court turns to the task of whether the state prosecuted
under comparable state law. Currently, a three-way split divides the relevant
jurisprudence. The majority rule, adopted by federal courts in the First,144
Second,145 Fifth,146 Sixth,147 and Eighth148 Circuits, generally follows the
holding adopted by the First Circuit in North & South Rivers Watershed Ass’n
v. Town of Scituate.149 The Scituate approach is most deferential to state law
because it compares the federal administrative penalties provision with the
entirety of the state enforcement scheme.150 Under Scituate, the state scheme
satisfies the requirements of comparability when it “contains penalty
assessment provisions comparable to the Federal Act, that the State is
authorized to assess those penalties, and that the overall scheme of the two acts
141

See, e.g., Jarrett v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. of Montgomery, No. 00-A-527-N, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 522, at *19–20 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2001); Carrow v. Javit, No. 292CV00429 (AVC), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16410, at *10 (D. Conn. Oct. 14, 1993).
142 See Jarrett, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 522, at *19–20. This standard is closest to following the
framework set out in the EPA’s 1993 Guidance. See 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 3 n.4.
143 See, e.g., Carrow, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16410, at *10.
144 See generally N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991).
145 See N.Y. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
146 See Lockett v. EPA, 319 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2003).
147 See Pape v. Menominee Paper Co., 911 F. Supp. 273, 276–77 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
148 Ark. Wildlife Fed’n. v. ICI Ams., Inc., 29 F.3d 376, 381–82 (8th Cir. 1994).
149 See 949 F.2d at 556.
150 Scituate is also known as the “overall comparability” standard. Id. at 556–57.
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is aimed at correcting the same violations, thereby achieving the same
goals.”151 Scituate also allows a diligent state prosecution to preclude later
actions even in the event the state did not collect a civil penalty.152 As
suggested in the previous section, the legislative history of the statutory
preclusion provision clearly indicates that preclusion would only be applicable
in cases where a penalty was actually being sought by, or had been paid to, the
state.
In Scituate, the court connected the primacy of state enforcement in the
preamble to the Act with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation that citizen suits should “supplement
rather than supplant” state enforcement efforts.153 However, the Gwaltney
decision does not address of how the balance should be struck between state
and federal efforts, indicating the Scituate Court’s seeming blindness to how
its decision-making on statutory preclusion might affect federal enforcement
efforts.154
Because the statutory preclusion provision applies to citizens and the EPA
equally, a violator can avoid liability for OPA civil penalties by entering a
consent decree with the state prior to the federal judicial action. That consent
decree can bar the federal action even if no actual penalty was paid to the state
or the state has no intention to collect a penalty. Thus, under the majority rule,
an OPA violator can entirely avoid civil liability if a state consent order
precedes federal enforcement—eviscerating the punitive and deterrent
functions of OPA 1990.
Next, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits follow the holding in Citizens for a
Better Environment-California v. Union Oil Co. (Unocal),155 determining that
only the provisions under which the state proceeded and the federal law should
be compared, specifically rejecting the approach in Scituate of evaluating the
entire state statutory scheme.156 However, courts adopting Unocal have not
applied criteria for assessing statutory comparability; rather, they merely
151 See id. at 556. For a comprehensive discussion of how the Scituate decision is contrary to the
legislative history of the provision, see Miller, supra note 12, at 33–38.
152 See Scituate, 949 F.2d at 556.
153 Id. at 555 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987)).
154 See generally Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. 49 (noting that the settlement involved was made to
avoid enforcement action).
155 83 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 1996); see Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage
Dist., 382 F.3d 743, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2004).
156 See Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d at 1115–17.
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require that the state must have proceeded under the portion of the state statute
comparable to the administrative penalties provision.157 The technicalities of
this interpretation only offer minimal comfort to the bar against OPA actions
because a state penalty proceeding under its administrative penalties provision,
so long as it is comparable to the federal administrative penalties provision,
will still bar the federal prosecution.
Finally, the Eleventh and Tenth Circuits follow the reasoning of McAbee v.
City of Fort Payne, which rejected both the Scituate and Unocal holdings.158
The McAbee approach assesses whether the entirety of the state statutory
scheme includes provisions for civil penalties, public participation, and judicial
review that are each roughly comparable to those contained within the federal
administrative penalties provision for an action to be brought under
comparable state law.159 In McAbee, the Eleventh Circuit held that Alabama’s
civil penalties and the CWA civil penalties were sufficiently comparable.160
However, the court held that lack of pre-hearing notice in the Alabama public
participation provisions of the state law did not meet its comparability
standard.161 By requiring the comparison of the public participation, civil
penalties, and judicial review portions of the statute, the McAbee decision most
nearly approximates EPA guidance.162
Because of the three-way split among the circuits, citizen and federal
plaintiffs face significant asymmetries in whether they will likely succeed in a
civil penalties prosecution after the state has commenced proceedings against
the violator. Courts in circuits adopting the Scituate holding are far more likely
to bar a federal or administrative suit subsequent to state action than in courts
adopting the Unocal or McAbee approaches.163 OPA violators in Scituate
circuits may be able to shield themselves from liability without even paying an
157

Id. at 1117.
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2003); Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. &
Energy Workers Int’l Union v. Cont’l Carbon Co., No. Civ-02-1677-R, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26858, at *17
(W.D. Okla. June 23, 2003).
159 McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256.
160 Id. at 1256.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1257; see also 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 3–4.
163 Compare N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991)
(barring a citizen suit when no civil penalty had been collected by the state), with McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1257
(only precluding a suit when the state had collected a penalty under a state enforcement scheme with
comparable civil penalties, public participation, and judicial review), and Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v.
Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1115–17 (9th Cir. 1996) (only precluding a citizen suit when the action was
brought under the statutory provision comparable to federal law).
158
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administrative penalty.164 Consequently, so long as a polluter enters into a
consent order with the state, regulated industries enjoy lower costs of
compliance in regions adopting Scituate relative to other regions of the
country. While asymmetric regional costs of compliance may not be a
significant issue for the locally operating wastewater facilities and
municipalities targeted by the general water enforcement provisions,165
industries regulated under OPA with multi-regional or national presence166 are
more likely to be hurt by a non-uniform rule.167 This is because operators
concentrated in circuits with the Scituate approach will enjoy relatively lower
compliance costs compared with operators concentrated in other regions.
2. Limited EPA Overfiling Actions
The EPA has “overfiled” a state under the CWA to collect a civil penalty
subsequent to state enforcement action on two occasions. Notably, the EPA
carefully considers whether it should overfile the state.168 EPA Regions
cultivate their relationships with state regulators, who often partner with the
EPA in joint enforcement actions.169 Overfiling places the EPA in the
uncomfortable position of being adverse to the state. This is a strong deterrent
to prevent EPA from exercising this authority. Moreover, the EPA is typically
very successful in obtaining settlements from both CWA and OPA violators. A
review of the national civil enforcement database reveals that the EPA has
successfully prosecuted numerous multi-million dollar civil penalties under the
CWA and OPA over the past several years.170 As such, the small number of
cases in which the EPA has chosen to overfile do not suggest that the issue is
not important. Rather the small number of prosecuted cases reflect the nature
of enforcement actions under the Act itself. Nevertheless, the preference for
settlement makes what law that does exist in the overfiling context particularly
important. Namely, any weakness or opportunities identified to strengthen a

164

See Scituate, 949 F.2d at 557.
See supra text accompanying note 100.
166 See supra text accompanying note 100.
167 See Alan Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257,
1262 (2010) (discussing advantages for reduced cost of doing business under uniform liability rules in tort
law).
168 Stephen C. Robertson, Note, State Permitting: United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc. and Federal
Overfiling Under the Clean Water Act, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 593, 594–95 (1999).
169 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 51, at 2–3.
170 See generally Civil Cases and Settlements by Statute, supra note 21 (noting various enforcement
actions).
165
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defendant’s negotiating position will be raised against the EPA in subsequent
settlement negotiations.
EPA brought its first overfiling action under the water enforcement
provision of the CWA in United States v. Smithfield Foods.171 In Smithfield
Foods, the Fourth Circuit held that the state had not proceeded against the
violator under a comparable statute because the Virginia penalty enforcement
scheme only allowed for the assessment of penalties with the violator’s consent
and did not provide adequate procedures for notice and participation.172
However, the court did not adopt a particular position with regard to statutory
preclusion defense.173
The EPA brought its first overfiling action under OPA in United States v.
CITGO Petroleum Corp., which also was the first case to go to trial under the
civil penalty provision of the statute.174 In CITGO, the company’s failure to
clean its produced water holding tanks resulted in a significant accumulation of
oil.175 When the tanks overflowed due to a large storm event, over two million
gallons of oil flowed into a nearby river, resulting in a fish kill and covering
numerous birds with oil.176 After the initial spill, the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality issued a compliance order and notified CITGO of the
potential penalties it faced.177 However, when the EPA initiated an
investigation for criminal penalties, the state suspended its activities.178 In the
subsequent civil case, the state joined the federal civil penalty prosecution to
bring additional actions under state law.179 The Fifth Circuit rejected CITGO’s
defense that the federal civil penalty prosecution should be barred, finding that
the state’s attention to the case after the EPA became involved was “at best,
desultory.”180 The state also joined the federal action in pursuing its own civil
penalties, suggesting that concurrent state prosecution may not bar a federal
action.181

171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

191 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 525.
See id. at 526 n.5.
See 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013); Isenberg et al., supra note 26, at 36.
723 F.3d at 550.
See id. at 551.
See id. at 549.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
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The danger of the CITGO opinion for federal enforcement of OPA is in
what the decision leaves unresolved. What would the state had to have done to
succeed in barring the action? Continue to investigate after the EPA’s criminal
investigation commenced? Collect an administrative penalty under the state’s
water enforcement provisions? What if the state had not joined the federal
action? The case raised the specter of the statutory preclusion defense, but
provided little analysis of what standard for diligent prosecution should be
adopted and did not reach the issue of how it would proceed with an analysis
of statutory comparability in an OPA action.182 As a result, the CITGO opinion
leaves a number of options open to less than diligent state prosecutors or oil
companies seeking to avoid federal liability under statutory preclusion.
In light of the three-way split among the circuits183 and the uncertainty
regarding how each analysis may apply in an OPA prosecution given the
limited jurisprudence on overfiling,184 there is no clear legal framework for
assessing a statutory preclusion defense raised in an OPA case. However, there
is broad potential for EPA civil penalty actions to be barred, especially in
circuits adopting the Scituate approach. The following Part analyzes how the
uncertainties and perverse incentives created by the statutory preclusion
jurisprudence undermine the effective enforcement of OPA.
II. STATUTORY PRECLUSION UNDERMINES EFFECTIVE OIL POLLUTION
ENFORCEMENT
This Part explores the consequences of the statutory preclusion
jurisprudence for OPA enforcement. Section A first considers how the CITGO
case is likely to affect the EPA’s enforcement activities, and concludes that
increased use of the statutory preclusion defense in settlement negotiations and
litigation will compromise the effectiveness of OPA civil penalty enforcement.
Section B examines how the reduction in the effectiveness of the OPA civil
penalty scheme compromises overall enforcement and is directly contrary to
the legislative history of OPA and the statutory preclusion provision. Finally,
section C demonstrates how uncertainty regarding the applicability of statutory

182

See id. at 550–51.
See, e.g., McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1252–1256 (11th Cir. 2003); Citizens for a
Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1115–17 (9th Cir. 1996); N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v.
Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991).
184 See CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d at 551; United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 526
(4th Cir. 1999).
183
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preclusion in OPA cases produces results antithetical to cooperative
federalism.
A. Increased Use of the Statutory Preclusion Defense After United States v.
CITGO Petroleum Corp. Will Erode the Effectiveness of Civil Enforcement
The CITGO case involved a highly publicized, two million gallon oil spill
that caused significant environmental harm.185 In fact, one media outlet called
the spill a “man-made devastation rivaling Hurricane Rita.”186 Although the
EPA negotiates consent decrees involving civil penalty actions under OPA
with considerable frequency,187 CITGO was the first case to go to trial for civil
penalties under the OPA amendments.188 The case also tested whether the
federal government could recover a significant civil penalty after the collection
of a large criminal penalty.189 As a result, the case attracted national
attention190 and environmental law firms and operators around the country
closely followed the case.191 The fact that the statutory preclusion defense was
raised, even though it was not successful, means that operators and
environmental counsel are acutely attuned to its availability in an OPA civil
penalty action. Consequently, once an operator anticipates a federal
enforcement action,192 it is likely that the operator will approach the state and
agree to a penalty before the federal action may be organized to avoid the high
penalties of OPA.193 State regulators wishing to keep the business of the highly
lucrative national industries regulated by OPA have a strong incentive to enter
these Consent Orders.194
As a result of CITGO’s national exposure of the applicability of statutory
preclusion of OPA civil penalties, the United States is likely to face growing
and significant pushback from violators that have received a state compliance

185

CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d at 549.
Rhonda Kitchens, Putting CITGO’s Oil Spill in Perspective, 7KPLC (June 27, 2006),
http://www.kplctv.com/story/5086955/putting-CITGOs-oil-spill-in-perspective.
187 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 8.
188 See Isenberg et al., supra note 26, at 36.
189 See id. at 37.
190 Fisk & Swint, supra note 28.
191 See Isenberg et al., supra note 26, at 1.
192 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2012). Because EPA requests § 308 responses to get details of various spills to
build a case and notifies violators when a case has been judicially referred, violators are put on notice well
before the time that they are likely to face prosecution.
193 Id. § 1321(b)(7).
194 See infra notes 27–32.
186
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order or entered into consent decrees and paid some kind of penalty to the
state.
As a part of any civil penalty assessment, the EPA must take into account
litigation risk, or the risk that the EPA might lose on an issue, in determining
its final penalty figure. Calculating litigation risk is more complicated in any
CWA civil penalty action involving prior state enforcement because of the
enduring circuit splits for diligent prosecution and statutory comparability.
And, it is further unclear how a diligent prosecution analysis or a statutory
comparability analysis should proceed when the OPA provisions are involved.
Thus, the calculation of litigation risk in an OPA civil penalty prosecution with
prior state action places a particularly heavy burden upon the EPA.
The growing size, scale, and diversity of prosecutions under OPA further
complicate the calculation of litigation risk.195 As regional and national actors,
OPA violators may do business in several states that span multiple federal
circuits, and thus have different state enforcement schemes and federal
statutory preclusion law to be applied.196 Because EPA takes more time to
build a multi-state or multi-region case, violators may have entered into
consent decrees with multiple states before a complaint can be filed. This
places the EPA in the difficult position of possibly needing to perform a
diligent prosecution analysis and a statutory comparability analysis for each
state involved and under different judicial precedent when the action could be
filed in district courts in different circuits.
Such difficulty in calculating litigation risk compromises effective OPA
civil enforcement. Generally, the EPA prefers to settle OPA cases and to create
compliance through the entry of negotiated consent decrees.197 But, significant
push back on OPA civil penalties during settlement negotiations because of
statutory preclusion may make it impossible for the EPA to comply with the
requirements of its civil penalty policy in collecting the economic benefit from
the violator.198 As a result, the EPA would need to devote scarce resources to
litigating OPA cases in federal court. Indeed, even though CITGO was the first
case to go to trial for civil penalties under OPA, a second case is already

195

See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
Consent Decree, supra note 17, at 14–18 (explaining that ten spill violations occurred in multiple
states and EPA enforcement regions 2004–2007).
197 See id.; Isenberg et al., supra note 26, at 37.
198 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 8.
196

LAMB GALLEYSPROOFS2

870

2/25/2016 10:07 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:841

underway in United States ex rel. California Department of Fish & Game v.
HVI Cat Canyon.199
Increased litigation under OPA may mean that the EPA will effectively
prosecute fewer OPA cases. This is mainly because DOJ and the EPA have
limited resources to prosecute cases, and it is more expensive and costly to
litigate cases rather than settle them. In specific instances, litigation risk may
shift the tenor of settlement negotiations. For example, in OPA enforcement
actions with fewer violations and less significant environmental harm, the
United States may settle cases at figures below the recommended penalty
policy due to litigation risk.200 As another example, in actions involving a
series of violations, the EPA may drop potentially precluded violations from a
larger enforcement action. Dropping violations undermines the objective to
collect economic benefit by allowing some violations to escape penalty.201
Thus, increased use of the diligent prosecution defense in OPA cases threatens
the efficacy of OPA civil enforcement. The following section explores how
compromising OPA civil penalty enforcement is contrary to legislative history
and reduces the overall effectiveness of OPA enforcement.
B. Reduced Efficacy of Civil Enforcement is Contrary to Legislative History
and Compromises Overall OPA Enforcement
Reducing the effectiveness of OPA civil penalty enforcement compromises
the comprehensive nature of OPA 1990. Congress envisioned strong
enforcement of civil penalties against violators as a key component of OPA
enforcement actions.202 As explained by Senator Lieberman, the author of the
OPA penalty provisions, it was intended that
in the event of a spill, the Government apply the penalty provisions in
a manner which will punish the violator and deter and prevent future
violations. Large civil penalties . . . are also especially important
because, in certain cases, the liability of the spiller for cleanup costs

199 In the midst of OPA litigation Greka Oil and Gas changed its name from Greka to HVI Cat Canyon.
Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive Relief, Cost Recovery, and Damages Under the Clean Water Act, Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, California Water Code, and California Fish and Game Code, United States ex rel. Cal.
Dep’t of Fish & Game v. HVI Cat Canyon, Inc., No. CV11-05097 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2011) [hereinafter HVI
Cat Canyon, Inc. Complaint]; Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 8.
200 See HVI Cat Canyon, Inc. Complaint, supra note 199, at 17–18.
201 See id. at 7–8.
202 See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 Joint Hearing, supra note 9, at 2–3 (statement of Rep. Fred Gilchrest and
Rep. Peter DeFazio).
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under Federal law is limited by the provisions of this bill; aggressive
penalties may need to compensate for this limited liability.203

Allowing a state action to limit the effectiveness of a federal civil penalty
action in an OPA case is also logically inconsistent with other provisions of the
OPA amendments. As described in Part I, courts are directed to take into
account the amount of criminal penalties a violator has already paid when
making a civil penalties assessment.204 Thus, it is clear that a violator may pay
both criminal and civil penalties to the federal government without potential
for preclusion.205 Both OPA criminal penalty liability and civil penalty liability
alone significantly outweigh state law liability under most state water pollution
laws.206 Yet, a violator first prosecuted under state law may entirely avoid
federal civil liability under OPA, and under more extreme judicial
interpretations, without paying any administrative penalty.207
The broad expansion of the statutory preclusion provision’s application to
civil penalties by federal courts threatens to eviscerate the overall deterrent
effect of the OPA provisions. Without a doubt, most OPA actions are brought
under the civil penalties provision of the statute, with accompanying claims for
injunctive relief. The core function of the civil penalties provision is to collect
the economic benefit a violator has obtained by failing to comply with
environmental laws.208 For the regional and national industries subject to OPA,
civil penalties play a critical role in leveling the playing field by taking away
any competitive advantage a violator may have enjoyed relative to those in
compliance with environmental laws.209 By forcing a violator to internalize
their costs of noncompliance, they also deter noncompliance in the future.210
Violators pay civil penalties into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.211 As such,
the federal government is unlikely to refer a case for judicial enforcement that
does not carry the potential for considerable civil penalty liability.
When the EPA is precluded from bringing a civil penalty action, the EPA’s
ability to prosecute oil spills is confined to claims for criminal penalties and
203

136 CONG. REC. 21724 (1990) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman).
See supra text accompanying note 86.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 86–87.
206 Which, even when identical to § 309(g), would limit liability to $10,000 per violation with a cap of
$25,000. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2)(A) (2012).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 149–52.
208 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 3–4.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 3–4.
211 Id. at 1.
204

LAMB GALLEYSPROOFS2

872

2/25/2016 10:07 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:841

injunctive relief.212 There are significant disadvantages to these courses of
action for enforcement. The DOJ and EPA continuously operate under a
shortage of prosecutorial resources, and there is no way for the agencies to
recoup these costs by statute. Prosecuting actions for injunctive relief alone
and prosecuting actions for injunctive relief and civil penalties each place a
demand on these limited resources. When an action is for injunctive relief
alone, the result is specific and tailored to an individual company.213 As such,
even if costly to that company, injunctive relief does not have a similar
deterrent effect on other companies as a civil penalty. Because civil penalties
have a stronger deterrent effect to other potential violators, EPA enforcement
prioritizes pursuing cases with significant penalties.214 Prosecuting violators
for civil penalties and injunctive relief is also a more attractive investment of
federal prosecutorial resources because OPA civil penalties are paid into the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, and in turn, fund the clean up of future spills.215
Prosecuting companies under the criminal penalties provision presents
different obstacles for successful enforcement. Primarily, bringing a criminal
penalty prosecution under OPA requires a much higher burden of proof than a
civil penalty action, meaning that criminal penalties are available in a smaller
subset of OPA cases due to evidentiary restrictions.216 Significant
environmental harm can occur, even when activity is not criminal, so confining
prosecutions to criminal liability leads to under-enforcement. Further, the
criminal penalty provisions target individuals instead of corporations, as is
generally the case under civil penalties.217 Thus, criminal penalties do not have
the same deterrent effect as civil penalties. Specifically, most OPA violators
are large, publicly traded corporations concerned with their public image.218
Tagging the corporation for liability, rather than the individuals it employs,
creates a strong negative association that adversely impacts the company’s
commercial reputation. Because the civil penalties provisions of OPA are the
heart of most OPA judicial enforcement actions, compromising the ability to

212 See Miller, supra note 12, at 29. Other branches of government may seek natural resource damages,
which are intended to fund the repair and rehabilitation of the environment after a catastrophic event.
213 For an example of a highly tailored course of injunctive relief in the context of a joint injunctive relief
and civil penalty prosecution see Consent Decree, supra note 17, at 14–23.
214 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 15.
215 Id. at 2.
216 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3)(A) (2012).
217 See id.
218 See Consent Decree, supra note 17, at 1, 11–12.
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bring civil penalties significantly reduces the effectiveness of OPA
enforcement.
C. Application of Statutory Preclusion to OPA Cases Undermines
Cooperative Federalism
This section explores how application of statutory preclusion undermines
cooperative federalism. Unlike the creation of the NPDES permitting
programs, which allow states to exercise primary control over water pollution
from point sources,219 Congress has never created a program to deputize the
states to enforce federal oil pollution laws.220 Nevertheless, the federal
government may desire to work cooperatively with states in prosecuting
violations of OPA to enjoy the benefits of sharing prosecutorial resources,
compiling evidence to build a stronger case, and developing more locally
tailored solutions in settlement negotiations.221
Because of the unclear jurisprudence regarding statutory preclusion, state
action cannot precede federal action without risk of statutory preclusion.222
Potential preclusion of OPA actions leads to a number of outcomes antithetical
to cooperative federalism. For example, the availability of statutory preclusion
incentivizes states to enact and maintain laws that provide the bare minimum
of environmental protection under circuit precedent. Moreover, such states can
administratively prosecute violators more quickly than the federal
government,223 enabling a state to limit a violator’s liability for oil pollution.224
Consequently, statutory preclusion encourages a race to the bottom among
states to gain favor with powerful industries, instead of facilitating cooperative
enforcement relationships with the EPA.225 The creation of significant
disparities in state and federal enforcement runs contrary to cooperative
federalism’s promise of shared responsibility for pollution reduction.226

219

See supra text accompanying note 34.
See supra text accompanying note 110.
221 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., supra note 51, at 2.
222 See United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013).
223 See id. at 549–50.
224 See supra Part I.E.1.
225 See Miller, supra note 12, at 8. This is not to be confused with the largely debunked argument that
cooperative federalism itself facilitates a race to the bottom. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition:
Rethinking
the
“Race-to-the-Bottom”
Rationale
for
Federal
Environmental
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211–12 (1992). Rather, undermining cooperative federalism facilitates a
race to the bottom.
226 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012).
220
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However, a race to the bottom among states and regulators is not the only
way that statutory preclusion jurisprudence undermines cooperative
federalism. This is because a consent decree entered between the state and the
violator that is not intended to have preclusive effect may do so under some
federal court precedent.227 Further, large spill events or chronic patterns of
violations may result in significant pressures on state regulators to proceed
against a violator before the federal government has the opportunity to build a
regional or national case.228 For example, there was no evidence that Louisiana
intended to disrupt a federal enforcement action in CITGO. But what if it took
the federal government longer to build a case?
Because of the greater liability provisions under OPA and the structure of
the federal enforcement scheme, handling oil prosecution federally rather than
through state enforcement has the potential to deliver a more comprehensive
and lasting solution. When a consent decree is entered between the EPA and
the violator, the terms of the consent decree are specifically enforceable.
Further, while factors weighed by states in issuing a civil penalty may vary,
federal civil penalty assessments must capture the economic benefit received
by the violator to more effectively deter future violations.229 And, federally
negotiated solutions can accomplish strong deterrence while delivering
community benefit. Federal law allows a company to conduct Supplemental
Environmental Projects (SEPs) to offset civil penalties in OPA cases.230 SEPs
are voluntary projects undertaken by a violator to improve environmental
quality in the area affected by the violator’s pollution.231 As a result, SEPs can
deliver greater local benefit to a community from a civil penalty action than
state action alone.232 Ultimately, the sub-optimal results achieved when a
federal action is precluded may actually serve as a disincentive to state
enforcement officials desiring to act quickly in the aftermath of a spill.
Discouraging diligent state enforcement undermines the envisioned primary
role of states in reducing pollution under the CWA.

227 For example, under the “bad faith” test, state prosecutions under these circumstances would uniformly
be upheld. See, e.g., Carrow v. Javit, No. 292CV00429 (AVC), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16410, at *10
(D. Conn. Oct. 14, 1993). Further, the statutory preclusion provision is silent with regard to intent of the
regulator. So, a state regulator simply trying to do the best thing for the community in prosecuting an oil spill
action may unintentionally bar a federal prosecution without meaning to do so. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6).
228 See, e.g., CITGO, 723 F.3d at 549.
229 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 3–4
230 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS POLICY 1 (1998).
231 See id.
232 See id.
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III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE TO RESTORE THE
STRENGTH OF OPA ENFORCEMENT AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
If the application of the statutory preclusion provision to OPA cases is such
a problem, why has nothing been done before now? Congress had the
opportunity to amend the statutory preclusion provision so that it would not
apply to the OPA 1990 amendments at the time the amendments were passed.
Yet, as suggested by the legislative history, Congress probably never
envisioned the expansive interpretation of the provision by federal courts. But
why not enact an amendment after the fact? Why has the EPA not done more
to advocate for a narrow interpretation of the provision?
The answer probably lies in the way that the EPA has done business under
OPA. In the twenty-five years since OPA 1990 was enacted, only two cases
have gone to trial under the civil penalties provision—providing very limited
opportunity for any exposure of the problem.233 Virtually all other OPA cases
are settled.234 They are the product of long, protracted, closed-door
negotiations between the violator and the EPA. It is impossible to determine
how many times the issue of statutory preclusion has been raised in such
negotiation for oil cases, or to know how many violators were even aware it
could apply to OPA before the CITGO case. But violators certainly know it
now.
But the relative knowledge of violators is not the only thing that has
changed. The Deepwater Horizon spill,235 controversies over fracking,236 and
the recent spill by Plains All American down the Santa Barbara coast237 have
kept the harm of oil pollution in the mainstream media discussion. Such
environmental catastrophes continue to dominate public discourse and
cultivate strong public sentiment against pollution of U.S. waters by oil and
hazardous wastes.
While comprehensive legislative reform would likely be the most effective
avenue for eliminating the application of statutory preclusion to OPA,
congressional stalemate over most environmental issues renders this an

233

See supra text accompanying note 22.
Civil Cases and Settlements by Statute, supra note 21.
235 See Partial Consent Decree, supra note 16.
236 See Hilary Boudet et al., “Fracking” Controversy and Communication: Using National Survey Data
to Understand Public Perceptions of Hydraulic Fracturing, 65 ENERGY POL’Y 57, 57 (2014).
237 See Blood, supra note 18.
234
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unlikely option.238 This may also be an opportune time for administrative
interpretation to limit the applicability of statutory preclusion. Recently, the
Obama Administration has also taken a particularly strong position on
strengthening environmental enforcement through regulatory actions and
litigation.239 For example, the Waters of the United States Rule significantly
expands the EPA’s jurisdiction240 by creating six categories of presumptively
jurisdictional waters rather than allowing for a case-by-case determination of
the waters that fall under this elusive definition.241 The Obama Administration
has also used judicial interpretation of the Clean Air Act in Massachusetts v.
EPA to expand its jurisdiction over greenhouse gases.242
That OPA actions have become more litigious in the past five years is no
accident. The public and the EPA are unlikely to be satisfied with a
significantly discounted penalty where there has been serious environmental
harm, and the EPA has shown recent willingness to litigate to obtain damages
up to the statutory maximum.243 Part III explores a potential solution to restore
the strength of OPA enforcement and cooperative federalism.
Unlike the citizen plaintiffs in statutory preclusion actions discussed in
Part I,244 the EPA has the opportunity to use litigation to limit the applicability
of statutory preclusion to OPA actions and ultimately resolve the underlying
circuit split. This Comment proposes that the EPA argue its determinations:
that the state has not diligently prosecuted or that the state statute is not
comparable to the EPA’s interpretation such that it should be accorded
deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council.245 Section A of this Part briefly reviews agency deference frameworks
applied by courts to lay the foundation for the EPA’s ability to argue for
deference to its interpretation of the statutory preclusion provision. Next,
section B explains the different procedural and analytical postures to justify the
application of Chevron. The following section, C, provides a construction of
the statute based upon EPA’s existing regulation for overfiling under the CWA
238

Osofsky & Peel, supra note 20.
Id.
240 U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EPA–ARMY CLEAN WATER RULE 14 (2015).
241 40 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2014) (outlining the Clean Water Rule).
242 Osofsky & Peel, supra note 20.
243 United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing an appeal in
which the United States argued that the $6 million penalty awarded by the trial court was inadequate for a
single large spill event and asked for the statutory maximum gross negligence penalty).
244 See supra text accompanying notes 144–58.
245 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
239
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and guidance documents, and a corresponding assessment of how such
arguments would fare under various deference frameworks. Finally, section D
explores the implications of applying Chevron deference to the EPA’s
interpretation of the statute to permit overfiling.
A. Differing Frameworks for Deference to Agency Decision-Making
When a federal agency provides an interpretation of the statute it has been
delegated by Congress to administer, a court will generally apply a deferential
legal framework to assess the agency’s interpretation of the statute.246 The
EPA has developed a legal247 and administrative record248 that permits it to
argue for deference under several deference frameworks.
The threshold test for what level of deference should apply is set out by
United States v. Mead Corp. Under Mead, the initial determination of a
reviewing court is whether the agency has acted with the force of law in
interpreting the statute it has been delegated to administer.249 Agency actions
that carry the force of law are those with general effect, meaning that the
agency’s construction of the statute is intended to apply to more than a
particular individual—indeed, it is intended to apply to all similarly situated
individuals.250 The most common examples of an agency acting with the force
of law are notice and comment rulemaking and adjudication.251
Once the court determines that the agency has acted with the force of law,
the two-step Chevron framework applies.252 The first question in Chevron is
whether the statute offers a clear expression from Congress with regard to the
issue in controversy.253 In the event that the intent of Congress is clear, the
court and agency must construct the statute to give effect to that intent.254 If the
intent of Congress is not clear, the court must determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is within the range of ambiguity permitted by the statutory
language.255 In the event that a federal court constructs a statute prior to the
246

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
See, e.g., United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001).
248 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note (2014); 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104.
249 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231–32.
250 See id. at 232.
251 Id. at 226–27.
252 Id. at 232.
253 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
254 Id. at 842–43.
255 Id. at 843.
247
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agency, the court should attempt to use its basic tools of statutory
interpretation.256 However, if the agency constructs the statute in a different
manner after the court’s decision, a reviewing court is bound to give the
agency deference to its interpretation, rather than apply the court’s previous
interpretation under National Cable & Telecommunications v. Brand X
Internet Services.257
When a court determines that the agency has not acted with the force of
law, then the analytical framework of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. applies.258
Under Skidmore, a court weighs the following factors: the thoroughness of the
agency’s consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with past
action, and all those factors that make it persuasive.259 The EPA has developed
a legal260 and administrative record261 that permits it to argue for deference
under both frameworks. Section B explains how the EPA should argue for
Chevron deference in future litigation involving the OPA provision of the
CWA.
B. Deference to the EPA in Judicial Overfiling
This Comment proposes that the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA, as
provided in its regulations,262 should be accorded Chevron deference in a
future overfiling action under OPA. This argument is rooted in holdings by the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits under procedurally analogous circumstances in cases
brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).263 Under
the RCRA and the CWA, the EPA has adopted identical regulations permitting
the EPA to overfile the state “when authorized by the applicable statute” if the
state collects a “substantively inadequate” penalty.264 Courts typically apply
256

See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
See id. at 980.
258 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001).
259 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
260 See, e.g., United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001).
261 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note (2014); 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104.
262 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note (“To the extent that [s]tate judgments or settlements provide penalties
in amounts which EPA believes to be substantially inadequate in comparison to the amounts which EPA
would require under similar facts, EPA, when authorized by the applicable statute, may commence separate
actions for penalties.”).
263 Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d at 1240; Elias, 269 F.3d at 1009; see also United States v. Murphy Oil
U.S.A., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1087–92 (W.D. Wis. 2001); United States v. LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp.
2d 827, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2000); cf. Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1999).
264 See 40 C.F.R. § 271.16(c) note (RCRA provision explaining requirements for enforcement authority);
id. § 123.27(c) note (CWA provision explaining requirements for enforcement authority).
257
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Chevron deference in the context of a challenge to a regulatory interpretation
adopted during notice and comment rulemaking.265 But in United States v.
Elias266 and United States v. Power Engineering267 the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits accorded Chevron deference to the EPA when it cited its regulation to
support overfiling in a judicial action.268
In Elias and Power Engineering, the RCRA enforcement provision of the
statute was silent as to whether the EPA had the authority to overfile the
state.269 Interpreting the CWA statutory preclusion provision under the “when
authorized by the applicable statute” regulation270 offers a slightly different
scenario. Unlike the RCRA statutory enforcement provision,271 The CWA
statutory preclusion provision clearly permits overfiling because it prescribes
some limitations to that power.272 Consequently, the EPA would merely be
constructing the statutory phrase “diligently prosecuting an action under
[comparable] State law” in interpreting its regulation to allow the EPA to
exercise its overfiling authority under the CWA,273 as opposed to whether
Congress had given it the power to overfile at all under the RCRA.274 The key
question in every Chevron determination is “whether the agency has stayed
within the bounds of its statutory authority.”275 Because the EPA answers a
narrower question in asserting its overfiling authority through its interpretation
in its regulations under the CWA than it did in overfiling under the RCRA, the
EPA is arguably in a stronger position to argue for Chevron deference to its
regulatory interpretation of the statutory preclusion provision.
The alternative mechanism for the EPA to obtain Chevron deference for its
interpretation of the statutory preclusion provision would be to institute a new
proceeding for notice and comment rulemaking and wait for this to be
challenged in court. However, there are practical reasons for the EPA to pursue
Chevron deference based on its existing regulation. Not only would further
notice and comment rulemaking be extremely time consuming and expensive,

265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
269 F.3d at 1009.
303 F.3d at 1240.
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note.
See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2012) (providing EPA may enforce a violation “in lieu” of the state).
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (2012).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 6926(b).
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).
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the EPA has also struggled in recent years to efficiently execute rulemaking
under the CWA.276 For example, the EPA’s recent rulemaking regarding the
definition of Waters of the United States received more than 900,000
comments, and incited considerable tension with the agricultural
community.277 Interestingly, the Waters of the United States rulemaking arose
as the result of a circuit split, and ultimately a split on the Supreme Court,278
suggesting that it is even more likely that the EPA will seek resolution to this
issue through litigation first.279
In the aftermath of CITGO, the EPA will likely litigate OPA cases with
greater frequency.280 Although EPA may fear the possibility of creating
unfavorable precedent,281 the OPA Civil Penalty policy forbids the EPA from
giving consideration to this factor in deciding whether to litigate a case.282
Given the advantages that arguing for Chevron deference to the EPA’s existing
regulation has over instituting further notice and comment rulemaking, it is the
best option for the EPA to clarify this area of law and make application of the
provision consistent with legislative intent.283 The following section proposes a
construction of the statute based upon the EPA’s water enforcement
regulation284 and guidance documents.285
276 The rule has prompted legal challenges from state and industry groups alike. See, e.g., Plaintiff State’s
Brief in Support of a Nationwide Preliminary Injunction, North Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
No. 3:15-cv-00059-RRE-ARS (D.N.D. Aug 10, 2015); Timothy Cama, Lawmakers Clash Over ‘Mythical’
EPA Water Rule, HILL (Feb. 4, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/231722lawmakers-fight-over-mythical-epa-water-rule.
277 Cama, supra note 276.
278 Id.
279 Because it is difficult for the EPA to effect notice and comment rulemaking, the EPA is inclined to
maintain inefficient procedures (such as assessing litigation risk under statutory preclusion) rather than
adopting new rulemaking. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent
Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 524 (1997)
(explaining ossification and proposing courts review “signals from interested parties, the regulators . . . and
Congress about [significant] issues”).
280 See supra text accompanying note 190–92.
281 See, e.g., Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 898, 902 (8th Cir. 1999) (prohibiting RCRA
overfiling in a state with an established permitting program).
282 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 18 (directing that the agency
should not seek to “avoid litigation or . . . potentially precedential areas of the law”).
283 A curious reader may ask why the EPA has not already adopted this approach. Close analysis of the
voluntary penalty scheme in Smithfield Foods and suspension of state investigation in CITGO reveals that
neither case was sufficiently ambiguous in relation to the statutory preclusion provision to merit further
interpretation of the EPA’s regulation. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir.
1999); Appellee/Cross-Appellant’s Cross-Appeal Reply Brief at 6, United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723
F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-31117), 2012 WL 5996162, at *6.
284 EPA State Program Requirements are noted in 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note (2014).
285 See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103; 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104.
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C. A Proposed Construction of the Statutory Preclusion Provision Based upon
Existing Regulation and EPA Guidance Documents
As evidenced by the split among the federal circuits, the EPA should utilize
its regulation to clarify two disputed areas of the statutory preclusion
provision. These are (1) the determination of whether a state is “diligently
prosecuting” or has diligently prosecuted286 a violator and (2) what criteria
should be used to determine whether a state statute is “comparable.”287 To
present the strongest case for deference, the EPA should base its interpretations
on its existing regulation, guidance documents, and federal and citizen
experience in litigating cases under the statutory preclusion provision.288
1. Setting a High Bar for Diligent Prosecution
First, the EPA should address the determination of diligent prosecution.289
The EPA’s regulation specifies that it has authority to overfile the state in the
event that the state collects a “substantially inadequate” penalty compared to
what the EPA would “require under similar facts . . . when authorized by the
applicable statute.”290 Following from its regulation, the EPA should argue that
in the case of a past prosecution, the state must have recovered the economic
benefit to the violator resulting from its actions.291 In the case of an ongoing
prosecution, the EPA should require that the state action be
contemporaneous.292 Finally, in both cases, the state prosecution should be
sufficient to gain “compliance without undue delay.”293
The EPA’s actions accord with prioritizing the collection of economic
benefit because the government is required to recover, at a minimum, the
economic benefit to the violator in OPA civil penalty actions.294 Subsequent
court decisions also support the reasonableness of economic benefit as a
286 Compare Carrow v. Javit, No. 292CV00429 (AVC), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16410, at *6–7, 10
(D. Conn. Oct. 14, 1993), with Jarrett v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. of Montgomery,
No. 00-A-527-N, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 522, at *19–20 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2001).
287 Compare N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1991), with
Citizens for a Better Env’t-Cal. v. Union Oil Co., 83 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 1996), and McAbee v. City of
Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003).
288 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note; see 1993 GUIDANCE supra note 104, at 2–3.
289 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 2.
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measure of diligent prosecution. Specifically, the court in Jarrett v. Water
Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of Montgomery examined factors—including
recovery of economic benefit to the violator and whether violations
continued—as part of a multi-factor framework to determine whether an action
has been diligently prosecuted.295 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit’s holding in
CITGO, where it overturned the district court’s award of civil penalties
because they were inadequate to capture economic benefit, affirmed the
importance of collecting economic benefit to enforcement.296
The EPA can also support this interpretation of “diligently prosecuting”
with a strong policy rationale and legislative history.297 As previously
discussed in Part II, civil penalties play a critical role in overall OPA
enforcement, particularly by leveling the playing field between OPA violators
by forcing them to internalize the cost of their failure to adopt sufficient
measures for environmental compliance.298 Ensuring that the state has
collected a penalty that is at least equivalent to the economic benefit to the
violator serves the critical functions of enforcement to deter future violations
and prevent a race to the bottom.299
Finally, the requirement that the state’s action be sufficient to “gain
compliance without undue delay”300 serves as a catchall provision. In the case
of an ongoing prosecution, it prevents a state from filing a compliance order
and then failing to take further action.301 In the case of past action, it likewise
prevents the state from evading the diligent prosecution requirement by
imposing a penalty sufficient to recover economic benefit, but stretching out
the payment period indefinitely. Under both scenarios, the provision would
also allow the EPA to present evidence of continuing violation to demonstrate
that the prosecution had been inadequate to bring the violator into compliance.
In effect, the proposed framework for diligent prosecution operates to ensure

295 No. 00-A-527-N, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 522, at *19–20 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2001) (noting the other
factors include “whether the government required or sought compliance with the specific standard, limit, or
order invoked by the citizen suit; whether the government was monitoring the polluter’s activities or otherwise
enforcing the permits at issue after settlement with the polluter and up to the time of the citizen suit”).
296 United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2013).
297 See Miller, supra note 12, at 12–13, 31–32.
298 See supra text accompanying notes 212–18.
299 Id.
300 See 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 3.
301 Such a strategy may be adopted by the state in the event that the state is concerned that it may lose an
important industry to its state. See supra text accompanying note 225.
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that a dilatory state prosecution does not serve as a shield for violators of the
Act.302
2. Providing a Framework to Assess Statutory Comparability
The second issue the EPA should address is clarifying the “when
authorized by applicable statute” prong of its regulation,303 the EPA should
argue that its interpretation of “proceeding under comparable state law”
described in its guidance documents, is entitled to Chevron deference.304
Consistent with the framework set down by the 1987 Guidance,305 the EPA
should propose that the state statute must provide a right to a hearing,
equivalent civil penalty liability, analogous penalty assessment factors,
analogous procedures for public participation, analogous standards for judicial
review, and analogous collection authorities and streamlined procedures.306
Additionally, the EPA should clarify that the proper civil penalties scheme to
be compared with state law is the OPA scheme in an OPA case. While the
general policy rationales are explained in Part I for each of the guidance
criteria, this analysis focuses on the likely effect of the provision and key areas
for OPA.307
In particular, the requirement of equivalent civil penalty liability in the
statutory schemes is critical to effective enforcement of OPA actions. If the
state does not have the same potential as the federal government to hold
violators accountable for their pollution with equivalent civil penalty
provisions, the statutory preclusion creates a perverse incentive. Specifically,
violators can enter into administrative penalty consent orders with the state
before a federal action can be commenced to bar the EPA’s prosecution at a
higher liability limit.308 State regulators, wishing to keep large and lucrative
industries prosecuted under OPA in their state,309 will be inclined to approve
such orders to promote state economic development.310 The enactment of
equivalent civil penalty liability schemes closes this loophole. Once a state has
adopted an equivalent liability scheme, the violator no longer has a reason to
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310

See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 107, at 3–4.
40 C.F.R. § 123.27(c) note (2014).
See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 3–4.
See id.
See id. at 4.
See supra text accompanying notes 125–27.
See supra text accompanying note 223.
See supra text accompanying note 95–98.
See supra text accompanying note 225.
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approach the state in the first place because it will face equivalent liability
potential to the state or federal government. If the state has not adopted an
equivalent civil penalty scheme, the violator would still face the threat of
overfiling because the state statutory scheme would not be “comparable,” and
thus insufficient to bar federal action.
A strong construction of statutory comparability also supports the ideal of
cooperative federalism inherent to the statutory preclusion provision and the
CWA.311 To illustrate, six months after the McAbee decision found that the
state statute’s provisions for public participation were not sufficiently
comparable to bar a citizen suit, the Alabama legislature amended these
provisions to provide pre-order participation to the public.312 These provisions
made environmental enforcement proceedings more publicly accessible, as
required by federal law.313 The aftermath of McAbee demonstrates that a high
standard for statutory comparability can be a powerful incentive for state
legislatures to align their provisions with federal law, opposing the potential
race to the bottom created by requiring minimal statutory comparability.314 The
creation of parallel and effective schemes for enforcement supports the ideal
shared responsibility of state and federal regulators for enforcement.315
3. The Proposed Interpretations Are Likely to Survive Chevron Review
The proposed interpretations of diligently prosecuting and statutory
comparability are likely to withstand the scrutiny of Chevron review.316 As the
starting point, the statute offers no clear explanation for the terms “diligently
prosecuting” or “comparable state law.”317 And, dictionary definitions of
“diligently” or “comparable” offer a range of meanings.318 Thus, a reviewing
court is likely to conclude that the terms are ambiguous and will proceed to
analyze whether the EPA’s interpretation is within the range of ambiguity
permitted by the statutory language.319
311

See supra text accompanying note 33.
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003); Environmental Management,
2003 Ala. Legis. Serv. 2003-397, § 22-22-A-5 (West).
313 See McAbee, 318 F.3d at 1256–57.
314 See supra text accompanying note 225.
315 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
316 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
317 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2012)
318 Comparable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited Nov.
2, 2015); Diligent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited Nov. 2,
2015).
319 See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
312
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Under Chevron, courts consider whether the agency substantiates its
justification of its interpretation of an ambiguous statute through application of
its expert knowledge to carry out legislative intent.320 The offered construction
of diligently prosecuting is likely to be upheld under Chevron because it
explicates the agency’s existing regulation, provides benchmarks for
assessment that are supported by legislative history, and reflects the agency’s
expertise to enforce oil pollution control laws. .
For statutory comparability, the EPA’s determinations of whether
overfiling is “authorized by the applicable statute”321 are similarly grounded in
legislative history and agency expertise. Further, the EPA can advance
additional arguments that the interpretation supports cooperative federalism
and effective environmental enforcement.322 Nevertheless, the EPA is likely to
face some pushback on the derivation of such a specific framework from the
phrase “comparable to this subsection.”323 The EPA can bolster its argument
with the fact that its regulations clearly require that the state must operate an
approved NPDES program to levy penalties324 and that the statutory subsection
contains each of the provisions the EPA adopts as criteria for comparison.325
Finally, Senator Chafee specifically outlined these requirements during his
floor statements on the provision.326
Defendants may also attempt to rebut this construction of the statute as
having the practical effect of creating an implied repeal of the statutory
provision as it applies to OPA. This is because the vast majority of states do
not have equivalent penalty regimes. In fact, at the time of this writing, only
Texas has adopted a penalty scheme with equivalent liability limits to the
federal provisions.327 Due to the presumption against implied repeals, this
would render the EPA’s interpretation unacceptable.328 However, the fact that
Texas has created an equivalent penalty scheme demonstrates that the
construction is not, in fact, an implied repeal. If Texas were to have enacted a
320

Id.; Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).
For examples, see the EPA State Program Requirements in 40 C.F.R. § 123.27 note (2014).
322 See supra text accompanying notes 314–15.
323 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2012); see Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171–72 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that requiring a seven-foot fence in a guidance document after issuing a regulation requiring a
fence of reasonable height invalid).
324 See 40 C.F.R. § 123.27(a)(3)(i).
325 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2012).
326 See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 5–6.
327 TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.251 (West 2010).
328 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978) (discussing the general presumption
against an implied repeal from subsequent legislative action).
321
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provision otherwise comparable to the administrative penalties provision as
part of its state law, it would have the ability to bar a federal action.
More generally, the interpretation of diligent prosecution and statutory
comparability based on the EPA’s regulation show a reasonable effort by the
EPA to carry out conflicting aims under the provisions of the statute. On the
one hand, the EPA is charged with the duty to vigorously enforce OPA to
eliminate oil spills nationally,329 which in large part is accomplished through
levying civil penalties.330 On the other, the EPA is supposed to avoid punishing
a violator twice under the statutory preclusion provision.331 Where statutory
directives conflict, the reviewing court will defer to the agency’s application of
its expertise to reconcile the terms of the statute.332 Consequently, the proposed
interpretations are likely to be upheld under Chevron.333
4. Potential Outcomes if the Agency Is Not Accorded Chevron Deference
Despite the likely success of the EPA in obtaining Chevron deference for
the proposed interpretation of its regulation, it is still worthwhile to consider
two other potential outcomes. First, the reviewing court could find that the
agency’s interpretation is simply outside the range of ambiguity permitted by
the statute. In declining to adopt the EPA’s proposed statutory construction, the
court must construct the statute to give justice to the parties in a present case.
However, the EPA would then be able to try for another construction in a later
action that may be accorded Chevron deference. Under Brand X, the court
would be obligated to review each attempt at constructing the statute by the
agency under Chevron rather than applying its precedent developed in a prior
case.334
Second, there is some risk that, in relying on its previously issued guidance
documents for statutory construction, a reviewing court may conclude that the
guidance documents issued in 1987 and 1993 are the actual documents that
should be accorded deference,335 and not the interpretation of the regulation
that the statute permitted overfiling.336 If the court reaches this conclusion, then
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2012).
136 CONG. REC. 21724 (1990) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6).
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 969 (2005).
See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103; 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104.
See supra text accompanying note 262.
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it is more likely to apply the Skidmore analysis rather than the Chevron
analysis.337 This is because the guidance documents, by their very name, are
non-binding on the agency or on individuals.338 Consequently, the documents
are unlikely to meet the “force of law” criterion for Chevron to apply.339 In
such a case, the proper deference analysis is Skidmore.340
Nevertheless, the guidance interpretations of diligently prosecuting and
statutory comparability are also likely to be upheld under Skidmore’s
multi-factor analysis. In issuing its 1987 and 1993 guidance documents, the
EPA closely analyzed legislative history341 and subsequent court cases to
develop its analysis,342 which demonstrated thorough consideration of its
interpretation and validity of its reasoning, one key factor under Skidmore.343
Further, in subsequent agency actions, the EPA has behaved consistently with
the guidance documents, satisfying another Skidmore factor.344 Regarding
diligent prosecution, the EPA issued an OPA Civil Penalty Policy that
emphasizes the importance of economic benefit.345 The EPA’s record of
enforcement is also consistent with the guidance considerations for diligent
prosecution and statutory comparability.346 Finally, the fact that the guidance
documents emanate from the EPA headquarters also a recognized factor that
makes the interpretation proffered by the agency more persuasive.347 With all
factors weighing positively in favor of deference under Skidmore, the guidance
interpretations of the statute are also likely to be upheld.
D. Implications of the Application of Chevron Deference
Once an interpretation adopted by the EPA is accorded Chevron deference,
the impacts will be far reaching. Under Brand X, once the agency is accorded
337 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (in which a headquarters letter binding
only on the individual was directed on remand to be assessed under Skidmore and not Chevron).
338 See id.
339 See id. at 218.
340 See id. at 221.
341 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 103, at 3–6.
342 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 2–3.
343 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
344 Id.
345 See OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 80, at 2 (discussing the role of civil
penalties in recovering economic benefit to the violator to deter future violations).
346 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (listing consistency with past agency action as a factor weighing in favor of
deference); see United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 1999).
347 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (indicating that a headquarters letter would be
more persuasive than a letter from a field office).
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Chevron deference for its interpretation of a statute, that interpretation
becomes controlling and overrules prior judicial interpretations of the
statute.348 Consequently, according Chevron deference to the EPA’s
interpretation of the statute would have the effect of overruling any prior case
law in that circuit on statutory preclusion. While this holding would need to
emanate from the Supreme Court to bind all the circuits, the adoption of
Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation is likely to be highly
persuasive,349 even in circuits with prior precedent. This is because failing to
adopt the holding as long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable would
contravene Brand X and likely be overturned by the Supreme Court.350 Thus,
the eventual effect of according Chevron deference to the EPA would be to
eliminate the circuit splits described in Part I.
Eliminating the circuit splits would have profound impacts for states, the
EPA, citizens, regulated industry, and the environment. First, states would be
presented with a menu of options regarding the types of laws to enact if they
wish to have the ability to preclude federal environmental enforcement. States
seeking the maximum level of independence could adopt civil penalty schemes
for enforcement comparable to the water and oil enforcement provisions of the
CWA to be able to bar the EPA from prosecuting violators under both the
CWA and OPA enforcement provisions. Because the federal government took
several years to implement OPA, a number of coastal states adopted
oil-pollution-specific provisions.351 The proposed interpretation provides a
framework for these states to develop their statutes into effective parallel
enforcement schemes, if so desired. The adoption of this interpretation of the
statutory preclusion provision would legitimize the gap-filling function of the
states in enforcing oil pollution actions for the first time.
At the other extreme, states wishing to leave the option for federal
enforcement open could keep more minimal statutory schemes that have
equivalent liability to neither provision, and rely on the threat of EPA

348

Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
No court has returned to the Harmon v. Browner rationale after the Ninth and Tenth Circuits accorded
Chevron deference. See also United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1087–92 (W.D.
Wis. 2001). Compare Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1999), with United States
v. Power Eng’g Co., 303 F.3d 1232, 1240 (10th Cir. 2002), and United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1010
(9th Cir. 2001).
350 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms., 545 U.S. at 982.
351 See Stolls, supra note 10, at 643–48.
349
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overfiling to deter pollution.352 States that wish to have the ability to bar EPA
prosecutions for water but not for oil would have the intermediate option to
adopt an equivalent civil liability scheme for water. Providing the states a
range of options without compromising the effectiveness of uniform pollution
enforcement carries out the ideal of cooperative federalism.353
Clarity regarding the diligent prosecution and statutory scheme will go a
long way to prevent the negative impacts of the uncertainty of the application
of statutory preclusion for cooperative federalism. Significantly, a state without
a comparable oil scheme could move quickly in prosecuting a violator without
compromising a larger federal action.354 The provision also destroys the
incentive for violators to enter into consent decrees with the state to avoid
federal liability.355 This is because, unless the state had recovered the economic
benefit and had adopted a comparable statute, the EPA would still be able to
overfile.356 Most importantly, the violator would be equally accountable
regardless of which authority prosecuted the action.
Second, resolving the circuit splits through Chevron deference also has
important implications for the EPA. Eliminating the circuit split largely
removes statutory preclusion from the calculation of litigation risk,
encouraging settlement.357 However, the reach would not be confined to OPA
actions, as it would be inconsistent to apply the statute differently with regard
to OPA and the other provisions of the CWA.358 Thus, the construction would
also be beneficial to EPA overfiling actions brought under water enforcement
provisions of the Act and citizen suits brought subsequent to state action.359
Being accorded Chevron deference would also place the agency in a more
proactive stance to ensure that the statutory preclusion provision carries out
legislative intent in the face of changing circumstances in environmental
enforcement. Because of the application of Chevron, the EPA would be free to
change its mind to adjust the legal rule to new circumstances, so long as its
proffered interpretation is justified and within the range of ambiguity permitted
352 See, e.g., United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 723 F.3d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 191 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 1999).
353 See text accompanying notes 33–35.
354 See supra text accompanying note 222.
355 See supra text accompanying note 310.
356 See supra text accompanying note 310.
357 See supra text accompanying note 198.
358 See Miller, supra note 12, at 29; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 133, at 3–4.
359 Citizens would still be subject to the notice provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (2012); id. § 1365.

LAMB GALLEYSPROOFS2

890

2/25/2016 10:07 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:841

by the statute.360 This proactive position restores the EPA’s leadership in oil
pollution enforcement, rather than placing the agency at the mercy of
misguided circuit precedent.361
Clearer construction of the statutory preclusion provision also stands to
benefit regulated industry. The pitfalls the current split of authority creates in
the enforcement of OPA also negatively impact regional and national
industries. Specifically, under the current split in statutory preclusion law,
companies operating in varying regions of the country face asymmetric costs
of compliance with the CWA.362 Nevertheless, most of the companies
regulated under OPA compete with one another nationally.363 A uniform rule
for statutory preclusion levels the playing field, at least in the area of liability
for oil pollution.364 Further, a uniform national rule lowers the cost of doing
business for both new companies and existing actors present in multiple
regions.365 Consequently, regulated industry also benefits from EPA leadership
in creating a national rule.
Most importantly, the ultimate benefactor from a uniform statutory
preclusion provision is the environment. Instead of serving as a shield to
violators of the Act,366 a strong uniform statutory preclusion provision closes
the loophole that undermines effective enforcement of OPA violations.367
Further, for the first time it would provide the opportunity for effective
national enforcement of oil pollution by states and the federal government368—
restoring the balance of cooperative federalism for an effective and
comprehensive scheme of oil pollution enforcement.369
CONCLUSION
The application of the CWA statutory preclusion provision by federal
courts is contrary to legislative intent and has practical, negative implications
360 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005) (“[T]he
Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it adequately justifies the
change.”).
361 See 1993 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 5; see also Miller, supra note 12, at 33–37.
362 See supra text accompanying notes 163–67.
363 See supra text accompanying notes 163–64.
364 See supra text accompanying notes 163–64.
365 See supra text accompanying note 167.
366 See 1987 GUIDANCE, supra note 104, at 4.
367 See Miller, supra note 12, at 8; supra text accompanying note 12.
368 See supra text accompanying notes 351–53.
369 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1) (2012).
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for effective enforcement.370 In no area of environmental enforcement is this
more apparent than the application of the statutory preclusion provision to
OPA, where current precedent threatens to eviscerate the effectiveness of the
civil penalties provision.371
Too long has the EPA sat back and watched these conditions unfold.372
This Comment has proposed a call to action for the EPA to argue that its
determinations of diligent prosecution and statutory comparability are entitled
to Chevron deference.373 If it is successful, the EPA has the opportunity to take
a leadership role in restoring the statutory preclusion provision to an
interpretation consistent with its legislative intent. The EPA will also
encourage cooperative federalism under the CWA by incentivizing states to
adopt vigilant laws for pollution enforcement.374 Such ambition supports the
development of a coherent legal framework for responding to and deterring
future oil spills, bringing the country closer than ever to the national goal of
finally ending oil spills into waters of the United States.”375
JENNIFER LAMB∗

370

See supra text accompanying notes 197–201.
See supra text accompanying note 212.
372 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6).
373 See supra text accompanying notes 352–54.
374 See supra text accompanying notes 352–54.
375 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1).
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